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Americans tend to view the automobile as the archetypal American product. 
Not only does auto production loom large economically, but the automobile 
itself bears a unique social relationship to the national self-image.'  Thus it is 
not surprising that, as the auto industry has followed the textile and steel indus- 
tries into a trade-related adjustment crisis, the domestic and international polit- 
ical economy  of that crisis has taken  on extraordinary  significance.* While 
there are some signs that the U.S.  auto industry has recently improved its com- 
petitive position, at the time this project was begun the industry had just with- 
drawn from a very publicly "leaked" intention to file a major antidumping suit 
against all imports of automobiles from Japan. This suggests that an evaluation 
of the current state of  the auto industry and its relationship to the industrial/ 
trade policy process in the United States is a matter of considerable impor- 
tance. Such an evaluation is pursued here. 
The main argument of this paper is that competition by Japanese auto pro- 
ducers in the US.  market constituted a fundamental threat to the regime regu- 
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1. The industry is a major consumer of steel, plastics, rubber, and machine tools, and it accounts 
(directly and indirectly) for something on the order of one in six people employed in the economy. 
A convenient short discussion of the economics of the auto industry is given by Adams and Brock 
(1986). For interesting discussions of  the more general social role of  the automobile and its pro- 
duction see Rothschild (1973) and Flink (1988). 
2. Note that this sentence does not imply a causal relationship between the textile and steel 
crises, only a family resemblance. In fact, however, the politics and economics of the steel and 
auto industries are closely related. As will be suggested below, one of the goals of this project is 
to consider this relationship in more detail than it has heretofore received. 
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lating relations among the major auto producers (GM, Ford, and Chrysler) and 
between  those producers and the  United Auto Workers  (UAW).’ Where the 
U.S. government played only a modest role in the historical  development of 
this regime over most of the auto industry’s history, the existence of a foreign 
threat ultimately  required  government  participation in  its reconstitution. By 
emphasizing the threat of Japanese competition to the sectoral regime, the po- 
litical economic perspective of this paper helps explain the centrality of trade 
policy to the auto industry’s political agenda during the late 1970s and  1980s 
when there is considerable evidence that a number of other factors were con- 
siderably more important in accounting for the industry’s economic problems. 
The first  step in  the  analysis is  an  examination  of  the  political  process 
through which the U.S. auto industry pursued and ultimately received protec- 
tion from Japanese competition. This is presented in section 3.1. In the next 
two sections we evaluate the economic basis of the industry’s aggressive pur- 
suit of protection, examining research on the competitiveness of  the industry 
(section 3.2) and on the effects of protection on industry performance (section 
3.3). On the basis of the research reviewed in sections 3.2 and 3.3 it is not at 
all obvious that trade protection was the most effective policy response to the 
industry’s economic problems. The remainder of the paper argues that the in- 
dustry’s political  strategy reflects  a response to a crisis in the political  eco- 
nomic regime regulating relations among the major interests in the U.S. auto 
industry. To make this argument, section 3.4 develops the notion of a sectoral 
regime and applies it to the auto industry. Section 3.5 develops the argument 
further, suggesting that conditions in the industry constituted a regime crisis 
and reexamines the industry’s pursuit of aggressive trade policy toward Japa- 
nese producers in this  context.  Section 3.6 illustrates the usefulness of this 
perspective by examining the politics of North American integration from the 
perspective of the auto industry. Section 3.7 concludes. 
3.1  The Politics of Protection in the Auto Industry 
Prior to the mid-l970s, trade policy  had  not  been  a priority  on the  auto 
industry’s political agenda. During the mid- and late 1960s the U.S. auto indus- 
try actively pursued access to the Japanese market, seeking both lower tariffs 
and liberalization of the Japanese investment regime. While these auto industry 
issues added somewhat to relations already strained over textile quotas, steel 
exports, and Okinawa, they were not significant political priorities to either the 
U.S. government or the auto industry. The industry  was far more concerned 
3. The concept of a regime, which is discussed in detail in section 3.4, refers to the institutions, 
rules, and norms that regulate relations among the members of the regime. We are interested here 
in the sectoral regime regulating relations among producers of automobiles-especially  the firms, 
labor, and the US. government. In addition, as we will see in our discussion of the politics of the 
integration of the US-Canadian auto market, independent producers of  intermediate goods for 
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with achieving relief from environmental and safety regulations. Beginning in 
the mid- 1970s, however, trade policy activism became a much more prominent 
part of the industry’s political agenda. In this section, we focus on the develop- 
ment of the main plank in that agenda, the attempt to regulate Japanese compe- 
tition in the U.S. market through both short-term protection  (via the escape 
clause/voluntary export restraint  [VER] mechanism) and through legislation 
on rules of domestic access that bring Japanese producers more explicitly into 
the regime (domestic content). 
The UAW was the first major player to actively pursue protection. Although 
the UAW  continued to support the liberalization program through the 1970s, 
the sharp increases in auto imports in 1974 led the union to publicly suggest the 
introduction of quotas. By mid- 1975 the UAW was supporting a congressional 
request (to the Treasury Department at this time) for a dumping investigation 
of auto exports from seven c~untries.~  There was a strong negative reaction by 
European trading partners, who suggested that such an action could threaten 
the Tokyo Round  negotiations,  which  was  a foreign policy  priority  of  the 
Nixon administration (though by  1975 the administration was presided over by 
Gerald Ford). In addition, the Council on Wage and Price Stability stated that 
not only was there no evidence of dumping but imports provided a moderating 
influence on U.S. prices and the International Trade Commission (ITC) investi- 
gation should be ended. In 1976, the Treasury Department decision (supported 
by the UAW) was that even though dumping existed in some cases, it would 
halt its investigation and seek a negotiated solution with the foreign compa- 
nies. In addition, the Labor Department ruled that workers in auto plants were 
eligible for adjustment assistance, even though the import share of  apparent 
consumption had  fallen  and  shipments  by  U.S.  producers  had  rebounded 
strongly in  1976 (38 percent  increase  in  value of  shipments from  1975 to 
1976). 
Despite industry statements in early 1977 that the increased competitiveness 
of  US. product offerings would hold imports to no more than  15 percent of 
the US. market, by April the import share stood at 20 percent with Japanese 
imports sharply up. By the end of the year the UAW was once again calling for 
import restrictions unless the Japanese invested in U.S. production. This de- 
mand continued to figure prominently in the public statements of the industry 
(and especially labor) in 1978 and was made an explicit part of government 
4.  This may well have been part of  a UAW  strategy to encourage Japanese investment in the 
United States. At least from the mid-1970s. the UAW  had suggested to Japanese auto producers 
that investment in the United States was in Japanese producers’ best interest. In  1975 Leonard 
Woodcock publicly argued for such investment, and in 1977 UAW vice president Pat Greathouse 
made a widely reported visit to Japan to lobby as well (Halberstam 1986). While neither of  these 
interventions was successful, U.S. investment by Japanese firms continued to be a major part of 
UAW political strategy. The claim that such investment was necessary to avert growing protection- 
ist sentiment in the United States always figured prominently in the UAW’s public statements. The 
call for quotas coming from a union with a strong free trade tradition is, thus, probably best seen 
as part of a strategy of encouraging local investment in the United States. 136  Douglas R.  Nelson 
policy when the U.S. trade representative  (USTR) pressured Toyota and Dat- 
sun to manufacture autos in the United States. The situation deteriorated fur- 
ther in 1979 with further devaluation of the dollar, higher oil prices, and world- 
wide inflation, The US. majors announced plans to invest billions of dollars 
in overseas production facilities (e.g., $10-$13  billion by GM). By the end of 
the year, imports had a 22 percent market share, industry production had fallen 
to a million units below pre-oil  shock levels, and more than 200,000 people in 
the industry were unemployed. Also by the end of the year, the industry became 
increasingly vocal in demanding some form of trade-related relief. 
Perhaps the most prominent auto-related event in  1979 was the near bank- 
ruptcy of the weakest of the Big Three, Chrysler, and the negotiation of a $1.5 
billion loan guarantee from the government as part of a package to assist in 
the restructuring of the firm.5  Chrysler had pursued an aggressive international 
expansion during the  1960s, running into deep financial trouble as early as 
1970 when it lost $27 million in the first quarter. When the first oil price shock 
hit, Chrysler began  selling off its recently acquired international assets and 
closing some domestic factories. In 1978 Chrysler lost nearly $205 million and 
owed more than $1 billion. When the  first half of  1979 proved even worse 
than 1978, Chrysler’s creditors became increa .ingly unwilling to extend further 
loans. The Carter administration did not strongly support the idea of organizing 
a financial rescue. The Treasury Department in particular was concerned about 
the precedent that would be set by such an action. On the other hand, the UAW, 
the Michigan  congressional delegation, and  Detroit  Mayor Coleman Young 
were  actively  mobilizing  popular  and  congressional  support  for a  bailout. 
Reich (1 985) reports only weak opposition, primarily from the unusual coali- 
tion of the National Association  of  Manufacturers,  Ralph Nader’s Congress 
Watch, and the National Taxpayers Union. Recognizing that 1980 was an elec- 
tion year, the administration agreed to extend large loan guarantees as part of 
a major reorganization. The plan  involved substantial concessions from the 
UAW  and the firm’s creditors and the replacement of  John Riccardo by Lee 
Iacocca. Even with the new money, Chrysler continued to have problems with 
demand for its new  K-cars  and ended the year with losses in  excess of  $1 
billion with problems continuing into 1980. The need for further financial as- 
sistance led to more concessions by labor and lenders in  1981, and by  1982 
Chrysler’s sales and profitability were improving. However, in 1979 and 1980 
the sight of one of  the Big Three negotiating  with the government for assis- 
tance to avoid bankruptcy was a graphic illustration of the plight  of  the in- 
dustry. 
By early 1980 many members of Congress had recognized that auto industry 
distress had widespread appeal as a political issue. That a core industrial sector 
5. See Reich (1985) and Reich and Donahue (1985) for an interesting account of the Chrysler 
loan in the context of  a more general discussion of  industrial policy in the United States. The 
details of  this paragraph are drawn from Reich (1985, 31  8-25). 137  The Political Economy of U.S. Automobile Protection 
long dominated by U.S. firms was “threatened” by Japanese competition crys- 
talized public concern with the nation’s economic performance and the role of 
“unfair” foreign competition in that performance. These public concerns made 
the auto issue a focus of a much wider range of political activity than even an 
industry as economically significant as the auto industry would normally ex- 
pect to generate. Furthermore, trade policy had become less “controllable” in 
Congress. Specifically, as a result of congressional reforms primarily induced 
by Watergate, the influence of the House Committee on Ways and Means was 
substantially reduced.6 Unfortunately, from the perspective of trade policy, this 
structure had been an essential institutional support of the liberal orientation 
of U.S. trade policy in the postwar era. Trade policy, because of the connection 
to tariff policy (a revenue measure), had historically been controlled by Ways 
and Means, and Ways and Means, at least under Democrats, had been con- 
trolled by supporters of the trade liberalization ~rogram.~  The post-Watergate 
reforms reduced congressional control of trade policy and reduced the influ- 
ence of Liberals on trade policy at precisely the moment when deteriorating 
economic conditions and increased international competition implied greater 
trade policy demands from well-organized industrial and labor groups.8  As we 
will see, committed executive leadership by the Carter administration resisted 
protectionist demands, as well as successfully completing the Tokyo Round. 
However, uninterest in trade policy during the Reagan and, to a lesser extent, 
the Bush administration resulted in greater congressional control, greater pro- 
tection and protectionism, and minimal advance in trade liberalization. Thus 
the threat of  direct legislation became more potent with the collapse of the 
committee system in the early 1970s. 
In March 1980 the Trade Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways 
and Means began hearings on the auto industry in which representatives of the 
UAW and Ford strongly argued for import restriction. On the other hand, the 
Carter administration, represented by USTR Reuben Askew, testified that such 
6.  One of the consequences of the Watergate scandal was the election of a freshman class of 
strongly reform-oriented representatives, and one of their primary targets was the committee sys- 
tem and the central role of the House Committee on Ways and Means in that system. Under Demo- 
cratic control of the House, Ways and Means exercised control over committee appointments be- 
cause  the  Democratic  membership  of  Ways  and  Means  was  constituted  as  the  Democrat 
Committee on Committees. Given the importance of committee assignments to reelection pros- 
pects, this gave Ways and Means a powerful tool for ensuring passage of key legislation. This kind 
of control, and the virtually authoritarian control by  the chair of the committee (Wilbur Mills), 
made Mills, Ways  and Means, and the committee system a natural target for a freshman class 
committed to improving democratic responsiveness. It is probably not irrelevant that a group of 
freshman found the central role of seniority to be a problematic element of the system. The reform- 
ers, with the unintentional help of Wilbur Mills, succeeded in reducing the power of Ways  and 
Means, and of  the chair within Ways and Means. 
7. During most of the postwar period there were two litmus tests for Democratic membership 
on Ways and Means-support  of the trade agreements program and support of the oil depletion al- 
lowance. 
8. Throughout this paper I capitalize “Liberal” to refer to liberalism in the traditional sense of 
support for minimal regulation of economic activity. 138  Douglas R. Nelson 
restrictions would undermine the effect of  the market forcing U.S. firms to 
become more competitive, would undermine access to fuel-efficient automo- 
biles when  energy conservation  was a key  administration goal, and  would, 
through increased prices, undermine the administration’s goal of reducing in- 
flation. Hearings on the state of the auto industry were also initiated by several 
other committees in the House and the Senate. Under increasing pressure from 
the auto industry and Congress, the Carter administration introduced a package 
of measures intended to provide economic support to the industry short of trade 
protection. These measures, involving both regulatory relief (especially from 
emission standards) and the provision of loan guarantees to auto dealers, were 
clearly intended to preempt protectionist pressure. 
However, Ford and the UAW remained convinced that trade action was nec- 
essary, and in June and August  1980 they filed escape clause cases with the 
ITC. Chrysler was not a major participant in this action because it had already 
received  assistance in the form of the loan guarantee and it did not want to 
oppose the administration on this issue. GM was unwilling to support the peti- 
tion at least in part because part of its strategy for responding to competition in 
small cars was to import small cars under its nameplate from Japan. Following 
standard procedure, the ITC initiated both internal studies and public hearings 
to  determine  whether  imports  of  cars  and  light trucks  were  a  “substantial 
cause” (understood to mean that no other cause was more important) of  the 
problems experienced by the industry. To rather general surprise, the ITC (on 
a 3-2  vote) announced  in November  1980 their  determination  that imports 
were not a substantial cause of the industry’s problems. Specifically, the com- 
mission  determined  that general macroeconomic  recession  was a more im- 
portant  cause, and that the demand shift toward smaller, more fuel-efficient 
cars was at least as important as increased import competition. As a result of 
these findings, the ITC recommended that the executive take no action against 
Japanese auto imports. 
One of the most interesting parts of  this story begins  with the election of 
Ronald Reagan to the presidency. The new president was the closest thing to a 
doctrinaire Liberal the United States has seen in the postwar era. Adding to the 
strength of the victory, the Senate also passed into Republican hands and, while 
Democratic control of the House continued, the size of the Reagan victory led 
to a particularly  prolonged and broad honeymoon. Furthermore, the Reagan 
government explicitly interpreted its victory  as a mandate for a Liberal eco- 
nomic program of deregulation and reduction of government participation in 
the economy. Nonetheless, four months  after entering the White House the 
Reagan administration announced a three-year VER program for autos. Part of 
the explanation for this surprising outcome derives from structural conditions 
that would have affected, say, a second-term Carter administration, but part of 
the explanation is administration and president specific. 
The structural conditions that would have affected any administration can 
be  sorted into two broad categories: public sentiment and institutional bias. 139  The Political Economy of U.S. Automobile Protection 
With respect to the former, it is clear that the public responds strongly to the 
perception of substantial economic distress experienced by a significant group 
of people. Furthermore, there is considerable research suggesting that people 
vote on the basis of such perception? When it is also perceived that the source 
of the distress is “unfair” trading practices by a foreign firm, the pressure for 
political action can become virtually irresistable. In the case of the auto indus- 
try, the existence of distress was unquestionable:  low or negative profits (fig. 
3.1), large drops in share of world output (fig. 3.2), substantial surplus capacity 
(fig. 3.3), rapidly dropping employment (fig. 3.4) and output (fig. 33,  and 
increasing inventories. All tell a story of an industry in distress. These statistics 
were widely reported in the press and usually accompanied by human interest 
stories of the implications for autoworkers, their families, and their communi- 
ties. The simultaneous large jumps in the market share of Japanese producers 
(fig. 3.6) led many people to conclude that there was a causal connection be- 
tween the imports and the distress. When we add the widely held notion that 
the Japanese government and industry cooperate to increase exports (“Japan, 
Inc.”), it is easy to see how increased Japanese market share could be seen as 
unfairly gained. The ITCS determination that trade, whether fair or unfair, was 
not a substantial cause of distress was irrelevant to large numbers of U.S. citi- 
zens whether employed in the auto sector or not. 
In the context of  widely  perceived trade-related  distress,  the pressure for 
direct action on the “political track” began.Io For a political entrepreneur with 
presidential ambitions, trade (and auto trade in particular) appeared to be a 
viable, national issue for the first time in nearly 50 years. In February  198  1, 
the new chairman of  the Senate Finance Committee’s Subcommittee on For- 
eign Trade, John Danforth, and the ranking minority member, Lloyd Bentsen, 
introduced legislation to impose a three-year quantitative restriction on auto- 
mobiles that  would roll back the  level of  Japanese imports to the  1978-79 
average. By May, the bill had attracted 21 cosponsors. Nelson (1989b) docu- 
ments in detail, for the case of the 1981 auto VER, the existence of systematic 
bias in favor of protection seekers from the way that the law of administered 
protection structures the politics of protection. In particular, that paper isolates 
three main sources of protectionist bias: definition of the issue, determination 
of  standing, and order of participation. The most significant of  these is the 
definition of the issue: the politics are defined in terms of  trade, and unfair 
9. Considerable theoretical research suggests that neither voting nor other forms of  political 
action are generally supported by individual pursuit of strictly self-regarding, materialist interests. 
Similarly, there is a substantial body of  empirical research, based on both survey research and 
econometric evaluation of  outcomes, that strongly supports the notion that elections are deter- 
mined by  “sociotropic voting,” is., voting based on evaluations of performance that extend well 
beyond material self-interest (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979, 1981; Weatherford 1983; Lewis-Beck 
1988). 
10. This discussion of  the “political track” is drawn primarily from Nelson (1989b). That paper 
also develops in more detail the notion of a political track and a technical track for trade policy out- 
comes. 140  Douglas R. Nelson 
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Fig. 3.1  After-tax return to shareholders’  equity 
Sources:  US. Department of  Commerce, Historical Statistics of  the United Stares (Washington, 
D.C., various years); U.S.  Department of  Commerce, Sratisrical Abstract  of the  United Stares 
(Washington, D.C., various years). 
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Fig. 3.2  Shares of world auto production 
Sources: USITC (198%); USITC, “The U.S. Automobile Industry: Monthly Report on Selected 
Economic Indicators” (Washington, D.C., February of various years). 
trade at that. Although after careful study and public hearings the ITC clearly 
came to contrary conclusions, the issue before Congress and the public was 
framed in terms of  international competition and the industry’s need to have 
protection from that competition. Directly related to this is the issue of stand- 
ing: who has a “right” to participate in the process.  While the ITC and the 
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Fig. 3.3  Capacity utilization 
Source: Fuss and Waverman (1992). 
Fig. 3.4  Employment indexes (1967 = 100) 
Sources:  U.S.  Department of  Commerce, Historical Statistics of  the United Stares (Washington, 
D.C., various years); U.S.  Department of Commerce,  Business Statistics, 1963-1991 (Washington, 
D.C., 1992). 
unless one's interests are directly at stake. Thus, for example, dealers of Japa- 
nese autos did testify against trade restrictions, but such testimony is often 
discounted because the dealers are in some sense foreign agents. Industries 
that are indirectly affected, for example, through general equilibrium effects, 
simply do not have standing. This is particularly true if the testimony is from Fig. 3.5  Production indexes (1965 = 100) 
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Sratistics of  the United Stares (Washington, 
D.C., various years); U.S. Department of Commerce, Business Statistics, 1963-1991  (Washington, 
D.C., 1992). 
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Fig. 3.6  Ratio of imports to apparent consumption by country of origin- 
Canada, Germany, and Japan: (A)  volume and (B)  value 
Sources. USITC (1985c), USITC, "The U S. Automobile Industry  Monthly Report on Selected 
Economic Indicators" (Washington, D C ,  February of  vanous years). 143  The Political Economy of US. Automobile Protection 
exporters, who, by definition, are perceived to be doing well. Consumer inter- 
ests, for the usual collective action reasons, are not generally well represented 
in the process. Finally, the protection seeker has a significant first-mover ad- 
vantage. Not only did the auto industry choose the specific form of  adminis- 
tered protection from which to start, but it controlled the timing and form of 
the public  debate over the  auto industry. Taken  together,  these  advantages, 
along with the public sentiment favoring the industry, suggest that any execu- 
tive would have been under considerable pressure to accommodate the auto 
industry. 
Nonetheless,  it is still  worthwhile  to compare the Carter and Reagan re- 
sponses to auto industry pressure. Both the international and domestic policy 
commitments of these administrations differed considerably. With respect to 
international politics, while trade policy was a strong priority in Carter admin- 
istration foreign policy, the  Reagan  administration was overwhelmingly  fo- 
cused on anti-Communism. Thus, although there was no shortage of free trade 
rhetoric, as Niskanen (1988) and others argue there was no coherent trade pol- 
icy and no leadership on trade. As a result, trade policy developed in response 
to initiatives from domestic economic interests, from Congress, and from trad- 
ing partners.” In the absence of strong leadership from the White House, Con- 
gress became increasingly assertive on the trade issue, legislating on a wide 
variety of trade issues-both  extensions of administered protection as well as 
expansion to new, aggressive market access legislation  (Super 301). As with 
international politics, with respect to domestic politics  President Carter was 
himself committed to trade liberalization and the resistance of protection. As 
a result, the administration was relatively consistent in its statements on trade 
and in its efforts to resist protection. Under President Reagan, the administra- 
tion was split between a small group committed to free trade (Regan, Weiden- 
baum, Stockman, and Shultz) and a larger, ultimately  more influential group 
committed to the traditional Republican strategy of  giving business what  it 
wants (Lewis, Baldrige, Brock, and Meese).’* In addition, Baker appears to 
have supported auto import restraints because of a concern that without them 
Congress would legislate restraints, and that a veto would sap congressional 
goodwill necessary to carry the tax reform that was the central priority of the 
administration  (Interview).  The combination  of  lack  of  leadership  with  a 
strong probusiness bias led to an inconsistent overall policy with a protectionist 
bias reflecting both the probusiness orientation and the congressional pressure. 
The result on automobiles was not  a fluke; again quoting  Niskanen  (1988, 
11. Although the Uruguay Round did start during the Reagan administration (the Punta del Este 
meeting was in September 1986), it was not the result of  a US. effort and was only closed with 
sustained effort by the Clinton administration. This may be unduly harsh on the Bush administra- 
tion, which certainly did pursue a stronger General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) policy 
than the Reagan administration. 
12. In addition to the useful discussion in Niskanen (1988, 139-41),  see also the colorful ac- 
count in Stockman (1986, 154-58). 144  Douglas R. Nelson 
137), “In response to domestic political pressure, the administration imposed 
more new  restraints  on trade than  any  administration  since Hoover.” Thus, 
while  the economic  and political  circumstances were  such as to encourage 
protectionist outcomes from any administration, the transition from Carter to 
Reagan resulted in a more protectionist, not a less protectionist, trade policy. 
The uneasy relationship between the official ideology of the Reagan admin- 
istration and its extensive trade activism led to difficult international relations. 
In the case of the auto industry, the attempt to protect the public perception of 
a commitment to Liberal trading relations while providing significant protec- 
tion to the industry led, first, to a preference for a “voluntary” export restraint 
and, then,  to an attempt to retain the appearance of  complete independence 
from the process of determining the level of the restraint.13 From fairly early 
on in the political  process, the Japanese Ministry of  International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) and the Japanese auto industry were supportive of some de- 
gree of export restraint. The problem was the unwillingness of the U.S. govern- 
ment to publicly bargain over and then commit to a specific level of restraint. 
The practical problem for the Japanese industry was a very real concern that 
such a restraint without explicit executive commitment could lead to antitrust 
prosecution. This produced an embarrassing period of nonnegotiation in which 
the Japanese government regularly  asserted its willingness to restrict trade if 
the United States would give it some idea of the level of restriction that would 
be acceptable, while the U.S. government asserted that if the Japanese wanted 
to restrict exports it would probably be a good thing (although the administra- 
tion was always committed to free trade). This culminated, in late March 1981, 
in a trip to Tokyo by USTR Brock that was explicitly not about the auto issue 
but at the end of which the Japanese government announced that it would vol- 
untarily restrict  its exports to 1.68 million  units (a reduction of 7.7 percent 
from the previous period) during the first year of a three-year agreement, with 
some unspecified growth in the next two years. In the event, given the contin- 
ued poor performance of the U.S. industry, the Japanese government agreed to 
retain the limit at the original level in all three years. 
In fact, as research reviewed in sections 3.2 and 3.3 suggests, given the de- 
pressed conditions in the US.  auto industry, the VER was not binding in its 
first two years. However, in  1983 and  1984, with a rebound  in domestic de- 
mand, the VER resulted in sharply increased prices and profits for U.S. firms. 
In fact, news reports of large executive bonuses in  1984 led to a considerable 
amount of  dissatisfaction with  the VER. Nonetheless, although some in the 
administration argued that the restraint should be allowed to lapse, the fact that 
1984 was an election year provided  sufficient support for the proponents of 
13. According to Stockman (1986,  157), Edwin Meese deserves credit for the strategy of  en- 
couraging the Japanese to voluntarily restrain auto exports without any official negotiations: “Un- 
der the Meese formulation our hands would be clean; the Japanese would do the dirty work them- 
selves. It was another case of not knowing the difference between campaigning and governing.” 145  The Political Economy of U.S. Automobile Protection 
continuing the  agreement in place for another year. The result  was that the 
agreement was extended to March 1985 with the quota expanded to 1.85 mil- 
lion units.14 With another year of high profits in  1985, the administration de- 
cided to let the  agreement  lapse.  However, given rent transfers to Japanese 
producers on the order of $2 billion (Hufbauer, Berliner, and Elliott 1986) as a 
result of  the auto VER, it is not surprising that the Japanese government an- 
nounced that it would be willing to continue the restriction  in the interest of 
maintaining orderly markets in the United States. 
The implementation of a protectionist policy against Japanese auto produc- 
ers was at best, from the perspective of the key members of the auto regime, 
only part of the strategy of socializing the Japanese firms in the norms of that 
regime. The other key element involved an attempt to force the Japanese firms 
to engage in local production with substantial local value added. As we will 
see below, well before its adoption of  trade  protectionism the UAW  had at- 
tempted to encourage U.S. production by Japanese auto firms. Given the politi- 
cal economic conditions described in this section, the UAW decided to make 
a major push for domestic-content legislation. In early December, 198  1 Repre- 
sentative R. Ottinger (D-N.Y.) introduced the Fair Practices for Automotive 
Product Act (H.R. 5133). The terms of this legislation (table 3.1) would have 
required Toyota, Nissan, Honda, Toyo Kogyo, Mitsubishi, and Isuzu, as well 
as Volkswagen (VW), to engage in substantial local production to retain their 
current levels of sales. Of these, only VW could conceivably have met these 
requirements. As with the politics  of  the VER, Ford and Chrysler supported 
the UAW on domestic content, while GM was strongly opposed. 
This legislation provides an excellent illustration of the breakdown of Ways 
and Means control over the trade issue that was described above. Representa- 
tive Ottinger was the chair of the Energy Conservation and Power Subcommit- 
tee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, and it was the Subcom- 
mittee on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of that committee that held 
the initial hearing on Ottinger’s bill. The bill was passed by the Energy and 
Commerce  Committee,  then  under  the  chairmanship  of  John  Dingell  (D- 
Mich.). Although the bill was referred to Ways and Means, Dingell arranged 
that his committee could override a negative report from Ways and Means.IS 
The chair of Ways and Means, Sam Gibbons (D-Fla.), was strongly opposed 
to the bill and tried to stall it by holding lengthy hearings, but Ways and Means’ 
capacity to manage legislation had declined. As a result, even though Ways and 
Means was strongly opposed to the measure, the House passed the legislation 
by a large margin (215-188).  It was recognized at the time that this was bad 
legislation and could probably not have been passed over a veto. Thus, given 
14.  It is interesting to note that GM lobbied strongly for an increase in the quantity limit to 
permit it to increase imports of Isuzu and Suzuki automobiles for sale under GM nameplates. On 
the other hand, Chrysler lobbied strongly for continuing the restrictions at their original levels. 
15. Le., Ways and Means was given only sequential referral. Kabashima and Sato (1986)  provide 
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Table 3.1  Summary of Terms under the Fair Practices in Automotive 
Product Act 
Required Minimum Percentage 
to Be Produced Locally 
Number of  Vehicles Sold  1983  1984  I985 + 
Less than 100,000  0.0  0.0  0.0 
100,000-149,999  8.3  16.7  25.0 
150,000-I 99,999  16.7  33.3  50.0 
200.000-499.999  25.0  50.0  75.0 
500,000 and more  30.0  60.0  90.0 
Source: Coughlin (1985). 
the public popularity of trade action on auto imports from Japan, representa- 
tives were fairly safe to engage in public position taking for electoral reasons. 
However, systematic econometric research suggests that these votes were com- 
pletely  consistent  with  a  public  pressure  model  and  that  less  dramatic 
domestic-content  rules  might well  survive.16 Although  the  legislation  ulti- 
mately died in the Republican-controlled  Senate, a clear signal had been sent, 
and over the next several years the Japanese auto producers began or expanded 
U.S. production. 
Given the expressed trade policy goals of the more active auto industry parti- 
cipants in the trade policy process (Ford and the UAW), one would  have to 
conclude that the industry was quite successful in achieving those goals: quan- 
titative restrictions were imposed on Japanese firms and the threat of content 
legislation appears to have been taken as, at least, plausible. The next questions 
relate to the economic consequences of that success. In the next section we 
address the preliminary issue of the competitiveness of the U.S. industry, fol- 
lowing which we examine the consequences of the VER. 
3.2  Competitiveness of the U.S. Automobile Industry 
Given the deterioration of market shares of U.S. producers in the late 1970s, 
it is hardly surprising that a number of studies have attempted to identify the 
foundations  of  that  deterioration.  In  this  section we will  consider  analyses 
based on relative costs of inputs (especially labor), technical efficiency, and 
managerial efficiency (especially labor-management  relations). However, be- 
fore considering  analyses of  declining  competitiveness  based  on conditions 
within the auto industry, it is useful to briefly consider the argument that the 
apparent  decline in competitiveness  was primarily  a function  of  macroeco- 
nomic disequilibrium of one kind or another. 
16.  The voting in this legislation has been extensively studied; see Coughlin (1983, Kabashima 
and Sato (I 986), McArthur and Marks (1988), and Marks and McArthur (1989). 147  The Political Economy of U.S. Automobile Protection 
At the broadest  level, it is interesting to note that all three postwar  surges 
in import share in U.S. apparent consumption coincide with macroeconomic 
contractions. The link between recession and the declining fortunes of the U.S. 
auto industry,  more  generally  the  highly  cyclical  nature  of  auto  sales,  is 
straightforward and often commented upon.I7  With respect to the third import 
surge (1979-SO),  the ITC noted, in rejecting the industry’s appeal for relief 
under the escape clause, that this period was characterized by “rapid increases 
in the cost of credit, increasing unemployment, declines in real spendable earn- 
ings, large cutbacks in consumer spending, and deteriorating consumer confi- 
dence in the economy and in future earning power” (US. International Trade 
Commission [ USITC] 1980, A-67-68).  Since a substantial part of auto demand 
in the United States is replacement demand and thus can be put off more or 
less indefinitely, recession results in postponement of purchases.I8  At the same 
time,  recession  also  resulted  in  substitution  toward  less  expensive,  small 
cars-the  market segment most penetrated by imports. When one recalls that 
this was a period of sharply increased gasoline prices, which also induces sub- 
stitution toward small cars, the increasing Japanese sales is readily understood. 
That is, the problems faced by the U.S. industry had more to do with the state 
of the macroeconomy than with international competition. 
In  addition to the effects of  depressed macroeconomic  conditions and in- 
creased gasoline prices, recent work has also emphasized the importance of 
disequilibrium exchange rates for the trade balance and, through the effect on 
competitiveness, on demand for protection.19  The early and mid-1980s saw an 
exceptionally sharp appreciation of the dollar, peaking in early 1985 and then 
dropping sharply (see fig. 3.7). Under the best of circumstances, such a dra- 
matic  appreciation  of  the  dollar  would  have  created  serious  problems  for 
import-competing firms. For an industry already beginning to experience re- 
cession combined with surging imports, rapid appreciation of  the dollar was 
extremely bad newszo  Eichengreen’s (1988) analysis shows employment in the 
motor vehicle industry to be strongly responsive to the exchange rate, as well 
as to energy prices and business cycle effects. Specifically, he estimates that 
17. These macroeconomic factors are given particular significance by  the fact that the ITC’s 
1980 rejection of  the auto industry’s escape clause petition was based on the conclusion by  a 
majority of  the commissioners that macroeconomic disequilibrium was a more significant cause 
of  industry distress than increased foreign competition. 
18. For systematic treatments of  auto demand that explicitly take into account the ability of 
consumers to delay purchases, see Smith (1975) and Westin (1975). 
19. For characteristic general discussions of the link between disequilibrium exchange rates and 
protection, see Bergsten and Williamson (1983). Corden (1984), Dombusch and Frankel (1987), 
McKinnon (1987), and the papers in Marston (1988). In the context of  the Michigan CGE model, 
Deardorff and Stem (1986, chap 5)  find the transportation equipment industry to be among the 
sectors most strongly responsive to exchange rate changes. This paper is not the place to discuss 
the causes of exchange rate disequilibrium in the 1980%  but see Obstfeld (1983,  Feldstein (1986), 
and Branson (1988) for useful discussions. 
20. Papers by Citrin (1985) and Clifton (1985) document the responsiveness of auto exports to 
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Fig. 3.7  Yeddollar and average dollar exchange rates 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (Washington, D.C., vari- 
ous years). 
“the real appreciation of the dollar between the second half of the  1970s and 
the first half of  the  1980s . . . reduced employment in motor vehicles . . . by 
nearly 10 percent” (1988, 330). Furthermore, in the early 1990s the major de- 
preciations of  the dollar against the yen  in  1985-88  and in the early  1990s 
appear to have substantially improved the competitiveness of  U.S.-produced 
autos relative to Japanese-produced  autos. The second of these episodes ap- 
pears to have encouraged the major Japanese producers to shift output to their 
U.S. facilities. However, Richardson  (1988) provides  a careful analysis of  a 
number of measures of  the exchange rate in the early and mid- 1980s with par- 
ticular reference to the auto industry and its competitiveness, concluding that 
exchange rate changes were a considerably less significant source of the indus- 
try’s  competitiveness  problems  than  deteriorating  cost competitiveness.  To 
which we now turn. 
The simplest approach to the analysis of cost competitiveness pursues a Ri- 
cardian strategy of  focusing only on labor costs and labor productivity to gen- 
erate a measure of unit labor costs. If this measure rises relative to that for 
manufacturing as a whole by more than the same measure for another country, 
one can conclude that the industry has shifted down the chain of comparative 
advantage. Kreinin (1982, 1984) presents the data in tables 3.2 and 3.3 for this 
purpose. For the United States, unit labor costs in the auto industry rise relative 
to the manufacturing  average, while in Japan the  unit  labor costs track the 
manufacturing average fairly closely, suggesting a deterioration in U.S. com- 
parative advantage in autos relative to Japan. It is interesting to compare the 
sources of  this change. In the United  States the majority of this divergence 
is accounted for by  wages rising relative to the manufacturing average while 
productivity  increased in line with  the manufacturing average. Interestingly, Table 3.2  Unit Labor Costs in the U.S. Motor Vehicle Industry 
Compensation  Output per Worker  Unit Labor Cost 
Motor  All  Motor  All  Motor  All 
Year  Vehicles  Manufacturing  Vehicles  Manufacturing  Vehicles  Manufacturing 
1967  100 
1968  107 
1969  113 
1970  122 
1971  139 
1972  148 
1973  159 
1974  178 
1975  200 
1976  218 
1977  243 
1978  265 
1979  284 







































































Source: Kreinin (1982). 
Table 3.3  Unit Labor Costs in the Japanese Motor Vehicle Industry 
Compensation  Output per Worker  Unit Labor Cost 
Motor  All  Motor  All  Motor  All 
Year  Vehicles  Manufacturing  Vehicles  Manufacturing  Vehicles  Manufacturing 
1965  100 
1966  111 
1967  126 
1968  146 
1969  172 
1970  204 
1971  233 
1972  272 
1973  346 
1974  448 
1975  530 
1976  599 
1977  656 
1978  723 
1979  776 
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wages  in Japan diverge from the manufacturing  average by  about the  same 
proportion as in the United States, while increasing relative productivity allows 
the Japanese auto industry to improve its unit labor costs relative to the manu- 
facturing average by a small amount. 
A number of studies have attempted to incorporate a greater variety of cost 
components at the expense of the general equilibrium framework developed in 
Kreinin’s Ricardian analysis. Specifically, in the late 1970s and early  1980s a 
number of  studies attempted to evaluate the competitive prospects of  the auto 
industry via fairly simple ad hoc accounting exercises. The two most promi- 
nent studies at the time examine relative costs in 1981, at the onset of the trade 
adjustment crisis: Abernathy, Harbour, and Henn (198  1, hereafter AHH; also 
Abernathy,  Clark, and  Kantrow  1983, hereafter ACK) and  Flynn  (1984).2’ 
They conclude that Japanese producers in 198  1 had a labor cost advantage in 
the  $1100-$1400  range  and  a  materials  cost  advantage  in  the  $600-$800 
range. AHH also argue that these differentials do not result from more capital- 
intensive production because the Japanese apply less capital per unit of output 
than do U.S. firms. Taking into account both transportation and marketing costs 
in the United States, ACK conclude that the Japanese had a $1200-$1500  cost 
advantage over U.S. producers in  198  1 .22 Flynn’s analysis is similar to that of 
AHH/ACK, though  there is more detail on the composition  of  labor costs. 
Ultimately,  Flynn concludes that Japanese  producers  possess a $1432  labor 
cost differential and a $1498 landed cost advantage. Cole and Yakushiji (1984) 
review a number of other estimates of the Japanese cost advantage, concluding 
that the landed cost advantage for a subcompact auto is $1468.?j 
Alternative approaches using more sophisticated approaches based on pro- 
duction theory estimated cost advantages of similar orders of magnitude.24  The 
most sophisticated  of  the studies of  relative  cost is by  Fuss and Waverman 
(1992, hereafter FW).25  FW  are particularly concerned to incorporate short-run 
2  I. AHH construct firm-level data for Ford, GM, Toyo Kogyo, and Nissan on labor and materials 
costs as well as a variety of other manufacturing and nonmanufacturing (including transportation) 
costs in producing a comparable (small) car. 
22. AHH arrive at the slightly larger $1650 as their estimate. Gomez-Ibanez and Harrison (1982) 
argue that the AHH/ACK estimates are based on a number of ad hoc assumptions that serve to 
artificially inflate their estimates of Japanese cost advantage. Simply adjusting for these factors, 
Gomez-Ibanez and Harrison conclude that the 1981 Japanese landed cost advantage was more on 
the order of  $800-$1000.  Fuss  and Waverman  (1992) make similar adjustments, in  particular 
drawing on a US.  Federal Trade Commission (1984) study that showed double-counting by AHH 
in their determination of US.  costs, concluding that the landed cost advantage for the Japanese 
was in the range $554-$896  in  1979 and $986-$1315  in 1981. 
23. Given the Kennedy Round tariff rate of 3.5 percent on motor vehicles and the then recently 
negotiated Tokyo Round rate of 2.5 percent, this landed cost advantage was judged considerable. 
24. The first of  these, Winston and Associates (1987). estimated landed cost advantages for 
Japanese firms ranging from $2098 in 1970 to $1301 in 1982. 
25. In addition to providing a sophisticated analysis of cost competitiveness in the auto industry, 
FW  are admirably clear on all stages of the research program leading to their conclusions: formal 
model, data construction, and estimation. One can learn much about how to do practical, industry- 
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market  disequilibrium,  in  terms of  excess  capacity  and  disequilibrium  ex- 
change rates, and technical change as fundamental elements of their analysis. 
With respect to capacity, FW  argue that the auto industry is characterized by 
product-specific  manufacturing  facilities.  If  tastes  shift substantially,  as  we 
have argued they did during the 1970s, significant variation in capacity utiliza- 
tion can occur, affecting measured efficiency.2h  Given the massive dislocations 
the auto industry faced in the late 1970s and early 1980s,  explicitly incorporat- 
ing short-run disequilibrium  would  seem to be a major advance. FW  find a 
very large cost disadvantage of U.S. firms (35 percent) in 1980 but find that 
this does not reflect equilibrium cost disadvantage but primarily the effects of 
short-term disequilibrium.  FW’s  results thus provide further support for the 
proposition that the industry’s economic problems were not primarily trade re- 
lated.*’ 
3.3  Economic Consequences of Automobile Trade Policy 
The standard approach to evaluating the welfare effects of protection  in- 
volves estimation of a simple, partial equilibrium model usually under the as- 
sumption of perfect competition. However, as we will see below in more detail, 
the auto industry is far removed from the state of perfect competition in both 
product  and factor markets. In addition to the fact that the industry is large 
enough to have sizeable general equilibrium effects, the industry is character- 
ized by both product differentiation and small numbers competition. As a re- 
sult, in the decade or so since the auto VER was introduced there has been a 
substantial amount of research on its welfare effects, using a wide variety of 
methodologies and assumptions about the market. 
The standard approach to evaluating the welfare effects of the VER involves 
a straightforward extension of the textbook partial equilibrium analysis of tri- 
angles and rectangles. The basic strategy involves taking observed price and 
quantity data as equilibrium values and using explicit assumptions about func- 
tional forms and estimates of elasticities of demand and supply. Since there is 
some evidence that consumers view U.S. and Japanese autos as distinct prod- 
ucts, virtually all of these studies develop distinct demand and supply relations 
for each, under explicit assumptions about cross-elasticities of demand. Tarr 
26. Bresnahan and Ramey (1993) explicitly study the effect of changes in demand across auto 
size segments on capacity utilization, presenting results which strongly confirm the existence of 
effects of the sort conjectured by FW. 
27. It is interesting to note that materials price increases are the major source of increased costs 
in all countries and improvement in technical efficiency is the major source of cost reduction for 
all countries except Canada, whose producers derive particularly strong benefits from improve- 
ments in capacity utilization. FW  are able to show that, while a substantial element of the U.S. 
disadvantage vis-a-vis Japan in the 1978-80  period (as well as virtually all of the improvement in 
1980-84)  was a function of  underutilization of capacity, the Japanese industry steadily improved 
its long-run equilibrium technical efficiency vis-8-vis the United States. Specifically, this study 
estimates that, over the 1970-84 period, while the Japanese rate of growth in total factor productiv- 
ity was about 3 percent per year, the rate for the North American industry was only about 1 percent. 152  Douglas R. Nelson 
and Morkre (1984) present a particularly  clear exposition of this methodol- 
ogy.?*  Under a variety of assumptions on elasticities and cross-elasticities, as 
well as on the initial state of demand, these studies yield consumer costs from 
$1 billion  to nearly  $6 billion,  consumer costs per job saved ranging from 
$95,000 to $220,000, and increases in domestic profit rent transfers to Japanese 
firms both on the order of $2 billion.29  The estimates for the years immediately 
following the imposition of the VER are consistently lower than those for later 
years. This is a result of the continuing recession in the industry. 
In all of the previous  studies the relations between firms were assumed to 
be competitive, or at least nonstrategic. We have already referred to a number 
of studies suggesting that this assumption is of doubtful validity. Furthermore, 
recent research on the relationship between exchange rate changes and the do- 
28. In addition to Tam  and Morkre, studies by  Hufbauer et al. (1986, 1993), Willig and Dutz 
(1987). and Gomez-Ibanez, Leone, and O’Connell(l983) apply this methodology to the auto case. 
An alternative approach involves the use of historical data from the unrestrained period to pre- 
dict unrestrained values of relevant data for the period under restraint. The ITC’s report on the 
VER (USITC  1985b) uses this strategy in conjunction with market assumptions of  the sort de- 
scribed above to derive estimates of employment and consumer costs for both a weak-demand 
year (1981) and a strong-demand year (1984). Crandall (1984) presents one of the first analyses 
of this sort along with a number of other attempts to develop estimates of the orders of magnitude 
of effects associated with the VER. These results are broadly consistent with the other studies, 
yielding considerably lower costs in the low-demand year than the Tan and Morkre estimates and 
very similar estimates for 1984 to those of Hufbauer et al. 
Following important theoretical papers by  Falvey (1979) and Rodriguez (1979). and empirical 
work by  Feenstra (1984, 1985, 1988a), a number of papers have incorporated quality upgrading. 
The basic insight of the Falvey and Rodriguez analyses is that if quantities are restrained, foreign 
producers will maximize the return per unit exported by  shipping higher-quality units, which sell 
for higher prices. This is the “quality upgrading” effect of a quantitative restriction. In terms of 
welfare analysis, since some fraction of the higher price is a function of higher quality, analyses 
that do not incorporate these effects will tend to overestimate the welfare costs of the VER. Since 
Feenstra concludes that two-thirds of the price increase is compensated by an increase in quality, 
the welfare costs are considerably lower than other estimates. Dinopoulos and Kreinin (1988) 
provide an interesting extension of the Feenstra analysis by incorporating substitution toward unre- 
strained European producers as well as toward U.S.-produced autos. Because their analysis finds 
considerable quality-adjusted price increases by European producers, their estimate of rent trans- 
fers is considerably greater than Feenstra’s. 
The final basic research strategy, based on a partial equilibriudcompetitive framework, in- 
volves explicit specification of a set of behavioral relations on prerestraint data and the comparison 
of the predicted results for the restrained period with the observed results. Collyns and Dunaway 
(1987) provide a particularly clear presentation of this approach, with particular attention to qual- 
ity  upgrading and nonrestrained foreign suppliers. Their analysis provides estimates that range 
from $1.65 billion for a low-demand year to $6.6 billion for a high-demand year. Bryan and Hum- 
page (1984) argue that inventory adjustment is an essential element of auto industry adjustment to 
shocks, and therefore, in addition to quality adjustment effects, they develop and estimate a model 
that treats such adjustments explicitly.  As a result of inventory adjustments, the employment effects 
in their model are much smaller than those found in other models. Thus the consumer cost per job 
saved is nearly seven times larger than the next largest estimate. Winston and Associates (1987) 
pursue a similar strategy, using predicted and realized prices based on Crandall (1987) and a so- 
phisticated model of auto demand incorporating general macroeconomic conditions and used cars 
as well as differentiated new  car offerings. They conclude that in  1984 auto employment was 
reduced by nearly 32,000 and consumer welfare costs were $14 billion. 
29. See case M-22 (automobiles) in Hufbauer et al. (1986) for a convenient survey of  the input 
data that have appeared in the literature. 153  The Political Economy of US. Automobile Protection 
mestic currency price of  foreign automobiles suggests that, especially Japa- 
nese, firms are able to adjust foreign currency prices to retain market 
This suggests the importance of evaluating the  sensitivity  of computational 
analyses of  the economic effects of trade policy in the auto sector to strategic 
behavior. Dixit (1988) provided the starting point for this important work. As 
with  competitive partial equilibrium  analyses like Tarr and Morkre (1984), 
Dixit takes observed price and quantity data to be equilibrium outcomes and 
uses the assumed structure of the market to calibrate a computational model 
that can then be used to perform policy experiments.”  Dixit adopts a clever 
strategy of using the conjectural variation term to evaluate the competitiveness 
of  the auto market in  1979 (a high-demand year) and  1980 (a low-demand 
year). Dixit’s primary conclusion, for our purposes, is that although welfare- 
improving trade policy  is possible, the gains are generally  small. However, 
Dixit also explicitly evaluates the interesting case in which, as a result of union 
bargaining, there is a substantial rent component in the auto wage. Since this 
creates an additional source of  gain from expanding output, the gains from 
trade activism are considerably greater. Further work by Krishna et al. (1989) 
and Fuss, Murphy, and Waverman (1992) make it clear that the results of this 
sort of analysis are highly sensitive to the assumptions made about the strategic 
structure, as well as to those made about the economic structure. As with Feen- 
stra’s research on quality upgrading, these papers suggest that the estimates of 
cost  of  protection  based  on  competitive  market  conditions  should  also be 
treated with caution. 
The final major extension of work on the welfare costs of protection to the 
auto industry involves moving beyond the partial equilibrium framework ap- 
plied in all the previous studies to a general equilibrium framework. De Melo 
and Tm  (1992, chap. 1) argue that this is an essential task because the partial 
equilibrium analysis produces systematic overestimates of the costs of protec- 
tion because they do not take into account the trade balance constraint and thus 
the effect of  changes in the real  exchange rate. Furthermore, in the general 
equilibrium context, agent welfare is affected by both price and wage effects. 
Nonetheless, even in the base case involving constant returns to scale and com- 
petitive behavior the de Melo and Tm  estimates of welfare costs exceed those 
in the partial equilibrium studies, primarily because their estimates of the rent 
transfer to foreigners are considerably larger than those in the earlier studies. 
Next, the authors examine a variety of alternative factor market assumptions. 
Their most interesting finding here is that, when there is an endogenous wage 
premium, the imposition of a quantitative restriction in automobiles raises the 
premium (i.e., increases the distortion), undermining the employment-creating 
30. This “pricing to market” behavior is inconsistent with competitive market conditions. For 
studies of  such behavior that  explicitly consider the auto industry, see Feenstra (1989), Ohno 
(1989). Marston (1990), Knetter (1989, 1992, 1993), and Gagnon and Knetter (1992). 
31. Krishna, Hogan, and Swagel (1989) provide a particularly clear exposition and extension of 
this methodology for the oligopoly case. 154  Douglas R. Nelson 
effects and, unlike  the case in  Dixit  and  Krishna et al., increasing costs of 
protection (see also de Melo and Tarr 1993). 
Two major results stand out from the considerable body of  research on the 
costs of the VER program for the auto industry. First, protection is quite costly. 
In Hufbauer et al.’s evaluation of special protection, only textiles and steel have 
higher total consumer costs. Second, in addition to the substantial magnitudes 
of these estimates, the other important regularity  in research  on the costs of 
the VER is the relatively low costs in the first two years of the VER resulting 
from continued recession  in the industry. However, the recovery  of  demand 
resulted in much greater transfers from consumers to both U.S. and Japanese 
firms. 
All  of  the research  reported above is essentially  static in nature. None of 
these papers address the more difficult question of the effect of protection on 
the long-term competitiveness of the U.S. auto industry. One of the problems 
in carrying out such an analysis is, of  course, determining the time horizon 
over which to make the relevant  evaluations. We  have already seen, for ex- 
ample, that the direct effects of protection vary over time, primarily as a func- 
tion of general macroeconomic conditions. We can, however, informally con- 
sider trends in three essential correlates of competitiveness:  wages and labor 
productivity, investment, and quality. With respect to wages, the industry expe- 
rienced a short-term gain in the immediate aftermath of the VER by extracting 
substantial wage concessions from the UAW. Ford and GM, in particular, nego- 
tiated wage reductions in 1982 in exchange for limited profit sharing. The ef- 
fect of these arrangements shows up in figure 3.8 as a sharp drop in the rate of 
increase of labor costs in 1983 and in figure 3.9 as a drop in the wage differen- 
tial between autoworkers and the manufacturing average. Figure 3.8 also shows 
a considerable increase in the rate of  improvement  of  productivity  of  labor. 
However, as figure 3.3 (following the logic of FW)  clearly suggests, much of 
this increase in productivity is due to substantially improved capacity utiliza- 
tion. With the protection in place, and the recovery of profits shown in figure 
3.1, the UAW was able to negotiate quite generous wage increases in the 1984 
agreements with Ford and GM. Again, these show up clearly in figures 3.8 and 
3.9. Given our previous conclusion that the jump in profits reflects primarily 
increased rent extraction from US.  consumers, this suggests that the postwar 
pattern of rent sharing between labor and capital in the auto industry continued 
more or less unchanged. Thus it would be difficult to conclude that the industry 
gained much in terms of its relations with labor from either import competition 
or the subsequent protection. 
To a considerable extent the senescent industry argument for protection re- 
lies on the protected industry using the period of protection to make fundamen- 
tal adjustments in the organization of production to improve its competitive- 
ness. It is certainly the case that all three U.S. majors have attempted to make 
both physical and organizational changes in response to competition from Jap- 
anese firms. As figure 3.10 suggests, the industry did undertake considerable 155  The Political Economy of U.S. Automobile Protection 
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Fig. 3.9  Ratio of auto wage to manufacturing wage 
Source: U.S. Department of  Commerce, Annual Survey of  Manufactures (Washington, D.C., vari- 
ous years). 
new capital spending in the immediate post-VER period and again in the early 
1990s.  In addition to the investments needed to develop and produce new prod- 
ucts to meet the demand for smaller, more fuel-efficient cars, the industry in- 
vested  extensively  in  new  production  technologies  (e.g.,  industrial  robots). 
Where the former investments seem to have been successful, at least for Ford 
and Chrysler, journalistic accounts suggest that the latter were not. In addition 
to physical investment, the U.S. majors have experimented with new forms of 156  Douglas R. Nelson 
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ous yeara). 
relations with both  labor and suppliers that emphasize greater flexibility. To 
this point, the record is mixed, with both striking success and striking failure 
at the plant level, but no discernible overall pattern.'* 
The final dimension related to long-run competitiveness  relates to quality 
and the perception thereof. At least as important as the industry's product-mix 
problems was the deterioration in quality and the widespread perception of the 
U.S. majors as suppliers of high-priced,  low-quality automobiles. Table 3.4, 
based on frequency of  repair data from Consumer Reports, suggests consider- 
able improvement in quality by  Chrysler in the late  1980s and early  1990s, 
while Ford and GM show no clear trend. While there has been some deteriora- 
tion of overall Japanese quality, the most striking fact revealed by table 3.4 is 
the continuing gap in quality between U.S. and Japanese producers of automo- 
biles. Perhaps most important, there does not appear to be any obvious rela- 
tionship between quality and the VER. 
One's overall evaluation of  the long-run effect of  U.S. trade activism with 
respect to the auto industry also depends on how one evaluates the increased 
investment in the United States by the major Japanese producers. Journalistic 
reports suggest that, without the VER and the threat of domestic-content pro- 
tection,  Japanese  firms  would  have  been  unlikely  to  invest  in  the  United 
32. Turner (1991)  reviews existing research on the attempts to reorganize production in the US. 
auto industry and develops additional plant-level research from the perspective of the union. A 
more systematic study by Katz, Kochan, and Keefe (1987) was unable to find strong statistical 
relations between measures of  production organization and productivity. 157  The Political Economy of U.S. Automobile Protection 
Table 3.4  Frequency of Repair for US.  and  Japanese Firms 



































2.8  2.9 
2.8  2.9 
2.9  3.0 
3.3  3.1 
3.5  3.5 
3.2  3.5 
3  .O  4.2 
3  .O  4.2 
3.0  4.2 
3.5  4.0 
3.7  4.1 
3.4  3.9 
3.6  4.0 
3.7  4.0 
3.8  4.2 
3.8  4.0 


















Note:  Every April from 1972 to 1992 Consumer Reports published an overall frequency-of-repair 
index (“trouble index”) evaluating autos on a scale: I-much  better than average; 2-better  than 
average; 3-average;  4-worse  than average; and 5-much  worse than average. The data reported 
in this table are average values for each U.S. major and for all Japanese firms taken together. Note 
that these averages are not weighted by  sales and no attempt has been made to isolate product 
lines that are directly competitive. 
States.33  In the event, however, the combination of a major realignment in ex- 
change rates and the nonunionization of their production facilities would seem 
to have increased the competitiveness of Japanese firms and made it harder to 
affect them through trade policy in the future. 
Overall, there is no question but that the VER resulted in a substantial in- 
crease in industry profits once the U.S. economy recovered from recession and 
auto demand increased.34  However, it also appears that those profits primarily 
reflect increased rent extraction from U.S. consumers. More important, Ford 
and possibly Chrysler appear to have made substantial adjustments over the 
period of the mid- and late 1980s that have increased their competitiveness vis- 
a-vis their Japanese competitors. It seems reasonable to conclude that the U.S. 
industry is somewhat smaller, somewhat more flexible, and somewhat more 
efficient. One must, however, be careful in evaluating the relationship between 
international competition, protection, and this improved competitiveness.  With 
or without trade protection these firms would have made the adjustments in 
33. See Halberstam (1986). Bhagwati, Dinopoulos, and Wong, in various combinations, have 
developed the logic of quid pro quo investment in some detail. See Bhagwati et al. (1992). It is 
interesting to note that their primary example is the auto industry. 
34. However, as examination of fig. 3.1 suggests,  this recovery was relatively short lived. Overall 
industry profits drop sharply in the late 1980s. 158  Douglas R. Nelson 
output mix, production facilities, and organization of production. It is Japanese 
competition not U.S. protection that accounts for the improvements in perfor- 
mance by the major U.S. auto producers. The Chrysler experience is particu- 
larly informative when compared to the VER. In the former case, the public- 
ness of  the transfer  and the emphasis on the responsibility  of  the Chrysler 
Corporation  and the UAW  for the problems of the firm and the solution to 
those problems  created  strong incentives to improve performance.  With the 
VER, the implication that the problem was, probably unfair, competition from 
abroad created poor incentives to improve performance. Whereas the Chrysler 
loan was repaid ahead of schedule, the VER, originally intended as a three- 
year measure, dragged on for nearly a decade. 
Table 3.5 provides a very rough summary of this discussion. The participants 
are entered in the table roughly in order of their degree of support for trade 
activism with respect  to Japanese  auto producers  (i.e.,  support for both the 
VER and domestic-content legislation): the UAW and Ford were the most ac- 
tive supporters, with Chrysler holding back during the early period because of 
the loan guarantee and the Carter administration’s opposition to auto protec- 
tion; GM opposed protection, but not very actively; and the Japanese produc- 
ers, and the dealers, opposed protection strongly. Although the consumer inter- 
est was not well represented (except perhaps by the dealers), they are included 
in the table to remind us that they are the source of most of the gains realized 
by the other participants. Because the restraint was not binding in the immedi- 
ate post-VER period, only the UAW experienced any effect. As a result of  the 
general economic conditions  the UAW  made significant concessions  during 
this period. The other agents in the auto industry experienced essentially no 
gains as a result of the VER. In the medium term, as the economy recovered 
and the VER became binding on Japanese firms, all of the active agents gained, 
while the inactive consumers lost. The evaluation of the long run depends on 
two factors: how one evaluates the use that was made by the U.S. firms of the 
period during which the VER was binding and how one evaluates the effect of 
increased Japanese investment in the United States. We have argued above that 
the former effect appears to be small and positive to zero, while the latter effect 
Table 3.5  Summary Table for Political Economic Analysis 
Time Horizon 
Participant  Short  Medium  Long 
-  +  -  UAW 
Ford  0  +  01 - 
Chrysler  0  +  01 - 
GM  0  +  01 - 
Japanese  0  +  + 
Consumers  0  +  - 159  The Political Economy of U.S. Automobile Protection 
is primarily negative. The entries in the last two cells in the third column reflect 
primarily the effect of a more competitive domestic market. 
3.4  Sectoral Regimes: Structure and Crisis 
The notion of  a sectoral regime is central to this paper’s analysis. An eco- 
nomic sector is defined in terms of a set of products that are understood by the 
firms and households that make up the economy to constitute a distinct group.35 
That is, the sector’s outputs are close substitutes in consumption and the firm’s 
understand themselves to be in competition with one another. While this may 
prove difficult to apply in general, the application  to passenger autos should 
not prove particularly  problematic (though, as the minivan case suggests, the 
boundaries  are always contested terrain). A regime is the  set of formal and 
informal institutions, rules, and norms that regulate the relations between the 
participants in the regime.36  In modem (i.e., “welfare state”) capitalism, sec- 
toral regimes are expected to support efficient contracting subject to provision 
of  satisfactory levels of  political economic  order and equity. Since sectoral 
regimes are ultimately  constituted by the behavior  of  the participants in the 
regime, when the regime fails to provide satisfactory performance with respect 
to efficiency, order, and equity, firms and households will engage in behavior 
which violates regime norms simultaneously with attempts to transform  the 
regime. We refer to such a situation as a sectoral crisis. 
A sectoral crisis can emerge for many reasons.37  The overall cultural and/or 
political system in which the sectoral regime is embedded can experience a 
crisis, undermining the performance of an otherwise perfectly stable sectoral 
regime.  Thus the “blue-collar blues” of the late  1960s and early  1970s that 
were widely held to have affected labor-management relations, and labor per- 
formance more generally, in the auto industry were clearly part of the larger 
social crisis affecting the United States as a whole in that period. Nonetheless, 
this  situation led to early struggles between the firms and labor in the auto 
industry to reestablish the terms of their relationship. Alternatively, crisis can 
emerge as a result of the normal operation of the regime. It is conceivable, for 
example, that Ford could increase its market share vis-i-vis GM to the point 
at which GM’s leadership was not sustainable but Ford was unable to assert 
equivalent leadership. The collapse of price leadership could result in extensive 
competition  reducing profits  and undermining  relations with the UAW  and 
suppliers. Again, this would be a sectoral crisis. The sort of crisis with which 
35. The idea of a sector used here is motivated by  Harrison White’s (1981a, 1981b) important 
work on the social structure of markets. 
36. The systematic study of such regimes is a central concern of economic sociology extending 
at least to Max Weber. For a recent focus on sectoral regimes in the US.  economy, see Campbell, 
Hollingsworth, and Lindberg (1991). 
37. Nelson (1986, part 1)  develops a theory of sectoral crisis, based on Habermas (1973), consis- 
tent with the discussion here. 160  Douglas R.  Nelson 
we  are concerned  in  this  paper,  however,  derives  primarily  from external 
shock(s) not easily accommodated by the existing regime. The combination of 
Ralph Nader, OPEC, and Japan produced a situation in the late 1970s and early 
1980s that the auto regime appeared unable to accommodate. In the next sec- 
tion  we briefly review the conditions that led to a crisis in the auto regime. 
Before that, however, we introduce the primary actors in the precrisis regime: 
the U.S. major auto producers, the UAW, and the U.S. government. 
It is convenient to think of the basic units of analysis in the political econ- 
omy as households and firms. Households own portfolios of factors of produc- 
tion (e.g., labor, human  capital, and capital) that generate a flow of income 
from which they consume and invest. In addition to their preferences over the 
goods available for consumption and investment, households also make evalu- 
ations of  the overall performance of the economy in terms that are not in gen- 
eral strictly self-interested. These latter evaluations form the basis of house- 
hold political activity, which takes the form of voting and making relatively 
small contributions to political entrepreneurs (see n. 9 on sociotropic voting). 
Firms hire factors of production from households and intermediate goods from 
other firms to produce outputs which are, in turn, sold to other firms and/or 
households. Whereas households are generally small with respect to both the 
economy and the political system, firms are not generally  Furthermore, 
while firms do not vote, they do engage in political action, often on a large 
scale, through direct lobbying and by making relatively large contributions to 
political entrepreneurs. Thus, while households and firms interact directly in 
the economy, they rarely engage in direct political conflict or cooperation. Fi- 
nally, unlike households, firm political activity is taken to be motivated strictly 
by direct, material self-interest. 
Household political activity has not played much of a role in the political 
economy of trade policy for the auto industry. We have just argued that the 
primary form of household political activity is either voting or relatively pas- 
sive support of political entrepreneurs. Because, until very recently, trade pol- 
icy has not  been  an electoral issue of  any  significance, this has meant that 
households have had no direct effect on its determination.  Of course, house- 
hold preferences  may well have an indirect effect on trade policy outcomes 
via their effect on overall macroeconomic perf~rmance.’~  Given the uneven 
distribution of production across electoral districts (except for that of the presi- 
dent), the optimal policy for a politician certainly need not be free trade, even 
if he or she is genuinely interested in maximizing  some notion of aggregate 
38. While one can  imagine this statement eliciting objections in general, when the actors in 
question are GM, Ford, Chrysler, and the UAW it must surely be unproblematic. 
39. Note that each household will have four elected representatives: one House member, two 
senators, and one president. It is important to recognize, with reference to research on sociotropic 
voting, that the community with reference to which a household makes its political economic 
evaluation need bear no relationship to any of  the relevant electoral districts. 161  The Political Economy of U.S. Automobile Protection 
constituent welfare.4o  Thus, even with the shift of  that production away from 
the eastern north central states, a state like Michigan with a large share of total 
auto output and a large share of auto production in state output could well have 
a positive optimal tariff for shifting  welfare  from the rest  of  the country to 
Michigan. If we take politicians to pursue some mix of social welfare maximi- 
zation and election-related venality, and the auto industry to generally prefer a 
tariff greater than the welfare optimal tariff, politicians will be cross-pressured 
on the tariff. Because the auto industry is so large, and so tied up in the Ameri- 
can self-image, these indirect effects are not insignificant. 
We will, however, focus primarily on direct political action. In particular, we 
will focus on the direct political action of the primary, organized participants in 
the auto regime: the firms, labor, and the state. 
3.4.1  U.S. Firms, the Auto Regime, and Trade 
The most significant actors in the political economy of auto trade policy are 
unquestionably the U.S. majors: GM, Ford, and Chrysler. These are three of 
the  largest firms in the  U.S. economy, engaged  in complex production  and 
distribution relations that extend into all 50 states. A key issue in political eco- 
nomic analysis relates to how such firms organize their competitive relations. 
On the one hand, the main properties of passenger autos as a product and the 
technology for producing and marketing them is relatively standardized. Given 
the small number of firms, this should permit some form of implicitly collusive 
behavior. On the other hand, these three firms have very different production 
structures and very different relations to the world economy. For example, GM 
historically has outsourced 10-15  percent of its component inputs, Ford 40-50 
percent, and Chrysler has varied widely  in its degree of vertical integration 
(Hunker 1983, 31). Perhaps more important, in 1980, 10 percent of  Chrysler 
sales, 22 percent of GM sales, and 45 percent of Ford sales were outside the 
United States; and while Ford actively pursues a strategy of global integration, 
GM’s  strategy  involves  local  integration  for  sale  in  national  and  regional 
 market^.^' 
Although GM was created from a number of  smaller firms under du Pont 
financial leadership, as U.S. Steel was created with Morgan financial leader- 
ship, all three majors retained a strongly entrepreneurial orientation. It is cer- 
tainly true that the considerable entry costs and GM’s dominant position in the 
post-World  War I1 market, until the large increases in Japanese market share in 
the early 1970s, served to make the auto industry, along with steel, the textbook 
40.  This statement makes no claim with respect to the existence of a coherent measure of aggre- 
gate welfare, nor with respect to the existence of instruments appropriate to achieve it. All it says 
is that a politician seeking to do the best for his or  her district could determine that a positive tariff 
on some industry, or industries, would be better than free trade. The theory of optimal tariffs and 
strategic trade policy are simply attempts to capture this type of  logic. 
41. By way of comparison, in 1980, Toyota, Nissan, Honda, Mitsubishi, VW, Peugeot-Citroen, 
and Renault all sold in the neighborhood of 60 percent outside their home market, with Honda 
selling nearly 70 percent. 162  Douglas R. Nelson 
example of a tight oligopoly. Casual evidence of  high profits (see fig. 3.1) and 
downward-inflexible prices are supported by numerous systematic studies sug- 
gesting implicitly collusive or leader-follower pricing behavior."* Nonetheless, 
GM never exercised the hegemonic domination over the auto industry that U.S. 
Steel exercised over the steel industry. Extensive competition for market share 
through styling changes, intensive advertising, and extensive dealer networks 
characterized the industry throughout the postwar era. Thus it is not surprising 
that,  although  the  auto  industry  is  collectively  represented  by  the  Motor 
Vehicle Manufacturers' Association (MVMA), each of these firms engages in 
extensive independent political a~tivity.~?  By contrast, the integrated steel pro- 
ducers, with a slightly larger number of major producers, have pursued a much 
more coordinated and aggressive political agenda on the trade issue. In addi- 
tion to the greater similarity in production and organizational structure among 
major integrated steel producers (compared to the auto majors), the steel indus- 
try has not had the tradition of corporate independence that has obtained in the 
auto industry from its founding to this day. 
Until  recently,  U.S. auto producers have been economically  confident  of 
their ability to compete in any market. Their domestic political  activity was 
focused primarily  on resisting government attempts to regulate  safety, emis- 
sions, and fuel economy. Prior to the late 1970s, trade policy was not a political 
priority of any of the auto majors. The industry's entrepreneurial tradition led 
it to generally support the trade liberalization program, and its success in turn- 
ing back the import surge of the late 1950s without government intervention 
made it uninterested in the administered protection mechanisms. To  the extent 
that it did pursue a trade policy agenda, the auto industry focused on support 
of liberalization in general and on access to closed foreign markets in particu- 
lar. In fact, during the late 1960s and early 1970s one of the most contentious 
ongoing issues between  the U.S.  and Japanese governments  was the desire, 
especially by Ford and Chrysler, to invest in Japan for local produ~tion.~~  How- 
ever, as Japanese exports to the U.S. market surged in the late 1970s and could 
not be controlled by captive imports and new small car offerings, the industry 
began increasingly  to seek protection. However, recall from section 3.  I  that 
there  was an  important split in the  industry: GM, confident of its  long-run 
capacity to compete in the United States and intending to rely on imports of 
small cars from Japan in the short run, was not a supporter of protection; Ford, 
whose  short-run  small-car  strategy  depended  primarily  on  Europe,  was  a 
strong proponent of protection. Chrysler was not active in this period because 
42. Adams and Brock (1986)  is a useful source for the more casual evidence of imperfect com- 
petition in the auto industry. For more systematic studies of the pricing  behavior that explicitly 
tests collusive and/or  leader-follower models, see Boyle and Hogarty (1975). Bresnahan  (1981, 
1987), Kwoka (1984), and Bemdt, Friedlander, and Chiang (1990). 
43. Actually, the MVMA no longer exists. In 1992, the name was changed to the American Auto 
Manufacturers' Association when the Japanese producers were expelled from the MVMA. 
44. See Duncan (1973) for a convenient journalistic treatment of the attempts by U.S. auto firms 
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it had already received government intervention in the form of  a government- 
backed loan, but  it  was to become  one of the  stalwarts of  the protectionist 
cause. 
Auto industry trade policy  activism illustrates an important aspect of  the 
political economy of  protection in the United States: intersectoral reciprocal 
noninterference. Auto firms are major consumers of steel, glass, synthetic rub- 
ber, electronics, machine tools, and textiles, all of which are heavily involved in 
the politics of protection on their own accounts, and all of whom have received 
extensive protection. Nonetheless, the U.S. auto majors, prior to the onset of 
their own trade-related problems, never actively opposed protection to these 
key upstream sectors. Part of the difficulty is that there is no institutional point 
of  access for antiprotection, except at the point of legislating the rules of  ad- 
ministered protection. At least as important, however, is the widely held norm 
that firms experiencing competitiveness problems have a right to protection, 
and firms not experiencing such problems have no right to oppose that protec- 
tion. That is, even though auto industry performance was affected by protec- 
tion to a wide range of  its  inputs, neither the auto majors  nor the MVMA 
violated the norm against interfering with that protection. 
3.4.2  U.S. Labor, the Auto Regime, and Trade 
The second major participant in the auto regime is organized labor-the 
UAW. In the early years of the twentieth century, the auto industry pursued an 
aggressively antiunion strategy, but the combination of the Depression and the 
Roosevelt administration led, through the efforts of the UAW, to industry ac- 
ceptance of union organization. During World War 11,  the relationship between 
the firms and the UAW was closely regulated by the National War Labor Board, 
but when the war ended, a brief, though intense, struggle ensued over the shape 
of the labor relations component of the auto regime. For the purposes of this 
paper, the three aspects of labor relations in the postwar era identified by Katz 
(1985) are particularly  significant.  Wage rules, involving an annual improve- 
ment factor (intended to increase wages along with improvements in produc- 
tivity) and cost of living adjustments (COLAS), led to steady increases in the 
wages and benefits paid to autoworkers and a wage differential between auto- 
workers and the average private sector production worker that held very steady 
at around 30 percent until the late 1960s. That is, as in the steel industry, the 
auto producers sought to insure stability in the industry by sharing the oligopo- 
listic rents with labor. This premium led firms to use large-scale layoffs as a 
strategy for dealing with the highly cyclical demand that characterizes the auto 
industry (fig. 3.11 compares percentage changes in employment in manufac- 
turing, motor vehicles,  and autos).45 However, the inflationary  experience of 
the 1970s led to an explosion in auto industry wages that, along with increasing 
45. It is interesting to note, in fig. 3.2,  that the auto industry employment follows the same cycles 
as does manufacturing as a whole, but, as is noted in the text, with considerably greater volatility. 164  Douglas R. Nelson 
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import competition, rendered this element of the labor relations subregime un- 
stable. Katz refers to the standardization of contracts across firms and across 
production facilities within firms as connective bargaining. This second aspect 
of labor relations in the auto industry, implemented through pattern bargaining, 
creates a highly hierarchical structure with national corporate leaders and na- 
tional union  leaders setting terms for the industry as a whole. The third key 
attribute of  labor relations in the auto industry was job control unionism: that 
is, the channeling of  union efforts to control the production process into de- 
tailed and legalistic efforts to define and regulate access to particular jobs. Not 
only did this render the production process inflexible from the perspective of 
management, but it also tended to alienate workers from the production pro- 
cess. Like the relationship between firms described above, the labor relations 
subsystem of  the auto regime was both  functional  and stable as long as all 
major participants in the market were covered by the regime.4h 
Unlike the auto majors, the UAW  (initially CIO-Auto Workers) was an ac- 
tive proponent of  the trade liberalization program within the union movement, 
in the Democratic party, and in Washington from the end of World War I1 until 
the late 1960~~~  This support was primarily related to the concern that a post- 
46. See Katz (1985, chap. 2) for a useful discussion of the ways in which this system of  labor 
relations served the interests of  both  labor and  management  in  the postwar period  prior to the 
shocks of the 1970s and early 1980s. 
47. See Leiter (1961) and Donahue (1992) for general discussions of  the politics of  trade and 
protection within the US.  union movement. In particular, both stress the strong support by CIO 165  The Political Economy of U.S. Automobile Protection 
war depression would lead to major reverses for the union  movement and a 
belief  that  liberal  trading relations  would  support continued  output growth 
through  export growth. The UAW,  which  left the AFL-CIO  in  1967, was a 
consistent supporter of the  trade  liberalization  program  into the  1970s. For 
example, when the AFL-CIO strongly supported the Burke-Hartke legislation 
(1973), Leonard Woodcock spoke strongly against it. However, by  1980 the 
UAW joined Ford in filing the escape clause suit for protection  against Japa- 
nese imports, and in the hearings on the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitive- 
ness Act, Owen Bieber was one of  the most  strident opponents of  the trade 
liberalization  program and one of  the strongest proponents of  an aggressive 
trade policy. 
Just as internationalization of  auto competition  undermined  the relations 
among firms in  the regime, the labor relations  system  was also threatened. 
Japanese competition affected U.S. labor relations in at least three important 
ways. First, considerable  evidence suggested  that relatively  low labor costs 
were a significant part of the Japanese firms’ competitive advantage. This led 
to a number of attempts by the U.S. firms to reduce labor costs. For example, 
GM attempted a “southern strategy” of  shifting production  facilities to states 
with a weak union tradition in the 1960s and 197Os, but the UAW was able to 
respond, maintaining virtually 100 percent organization of production workers 
in Big Three production facilities. More successfully, given the lower degree 
of success of the UAW in the auto parts industry, all three firms have spun off 
facilities engaged in parts production. The data in table 3.6 are fairly sugges- 
tive in this regard: the wage differential between production workers in auto 
production and in manufacturing has increased, but the share of  production 
worker wages in value added in the final production of  autos (SIC 37 11) has 
fallen, as has the share of final motor vehicle production in total auto produc- 
tion (SIC 3711+3714). Second, it has been widely argued that the Japanese 
auto producers  have  developed  a  new  managementlproduction  technology 
(“lean production”)  that produces higher-quality  autos at lower  At- 
tempts by US.  firms to implement mixes of team production, flexible machine 
tools, and robots in final assembly have met with considerable resistance from 
the  UAW  in  many plants, and even when  such programs  have been  imple- 
mented, many have been  less than  successful (Turner  1991, chap.  1; Keller 
1993). Nonetheless, the evidence of Japanese success with less restrictive labor 
regimes  has  created  additional tension  in  the  structure of  the  auto regime. 
Third, the local production of autos by Japanese firms in the United States has 
raised both of these issues in even more striking ways as, at least to date, these 
firms have been successful at resisting union organization of their production 
unions of the trade liberalization program, and Donahue stresses the leadership role of the CIO- 
Auto Workers. 
48. The standard reference on this argument is the best-seller from MIT’s International Motor 
Vehicle Program, The Machine That Changed the World: The Story of Lean Producrion (Womack, 
Jones, and Roos  I99  I). 166  Douglas R. Nelson 
Table 3.6  Employment Data for Auto Industry 
Auto  Auto Wage Bill/  Auto/  Auto/ 
Employment  Auto Wage  Value Added  Manufacturing  Manufacturing 
Year  (thousands)  ($ per hour)  (S)  Employment  Wage 
I967  262.3 
I968  272.4 
1969  293.4 
I970  245.3 
1971  283.0 
1972  284.0 
I973  309.1 
1974  262.2 
I975  235. I 
1976  273.8 
1977  289.9 
1978  303.5 
I919  292.0 
I980  220.6 
1981  223.4 
I982  193.5 
1983  216.5 
I984  247.6 
1985  249.7 
I986  233.8 
1987  235.5 
1988  213.6 
1989  212.5 
1990  200.0 





































































































Source: US.  Department of Commerce, Survey of  Current Business (Washington, D.C.: Govern- 
ment Printing Office, various years), for SIC 371 1 (motor vehicles and car bodies). 
facilities, and they have begun to implement labor and supplier management 
strategies more like those found in Japan than like those found in the United 
States. 
3.4.3  The U.S. Government, the Auto Regime, and Trade 
The final major participant in the auto regime is the state. Although the U.S. 
government is not involved in direct corporatist arrangements of  the sort that 
characterize auto regimes in, say, Germany and Japan, it remains a major par- 
ti~ipant.~~  Most obviously, the state stands behind any legally constituted ele- 
49. Although the Japanese industry has been notable for its independence from MITI, relative 
to other sectors of Japanese industry, it is also the case that MITI has been heavily involved in the 
promotion of the industry and in attempts to restructure the industry. A useful short discussion can 
be found in Cusumano (1985, Introduction). The close relations between industry and the state, 
with a subordinate labor movement, have led Pempel and Tsunekawa (1979) to refer to Japanese 
corporatism  as “corporatism without labor.”  The German  case is  more classically corporatist: 167  The Political Economy of U.S. Automobile Protection 
ments of the regime-for  example, labor law.  Similarly, it has been argued 
that American antitrust law (especially the Sherman Antitrust Act) that outlaws 
collusion but permits extensive vertical and horizontal integration has encour- 
aged the creation of large, integrated firms in the United States (Bork  1978; 
Lamoreaux  1985).’” Labor and antitrust law were not particular problems for 
the auto industry in the postwar period, and the industry did benefit from exten- 
sive road building and low gasoline taxes. As a result, given its size and sig- 
nificance, the auto industry has had a surprisingly small and relatively coopera- 
tive  relationship  with  the  state.  This  can  be  contrasted  with  the  stormy 
relationship between the steel industry and the state. As consumerism and envi- 
ronmentalism became significant political forces, both of which focused sig- 
nificant parts of their political efforts on the auto industry, however, this relaxed 
relationship began to break down. 
The trade policy  goals of the U.S. government are harder to characterize. 
Prior to  1980 it would not be unreasonable to characterize the preferences of 
the U.S. executive as strongly Liberal. That is, the executive has aggressively 
pursued extensions of the trade agreements program and the GATT while op- 
posing extensions of both legislated and administered pr~tection.~’  While some 
of this may be attributable to the president’s national constituency, it is more 
significant that, for the president, trade policy  has been primarily a foreign 
policy issue and, because the preeminent foreign policy goal has been contain- 
ment of Communism, the extension and protection (against protectionists) of 
the multilateral trading system has been seen as a key instrument in the pursuit 
of that goal. On the other hand, for Congress trade policy is primarily a domes- 
tic political issue. However, as long as the executive was able to attach trade 
policy to foreign policy the trade agreements program was relatively safe and 
strong, centralized owners’ associations face a strong, centralized union. The national government 
has rarely intervened in the auto industry, though state governments have been quite active and the 
“big three” banks (Commcrzbank, Deutsche Bank, and Dresdner Bank) have also played a major 
role. Zysman  (I  983) presents an extensive discussion  of the role of banks in policy making. See 
Hart (1992) for a useful discussion of industrial policies for the auto industry in the United States, 
Japan, France, United Kingdom, and Germany. 
SO.  It  is interesting  to note  that  virtually  all of  the antitrust actions against  auto firms have 
involved noncore activities of  the firms. Thus, the 1953 suit against GM and the  1964 suit against 
Chrysler involved attempts to acquirc the Euclid Motor Machine Company and Mack Truck, re- 
spectively; while the  1961 suit against Ford involved Electric Auto-Lite Company. Similarly, the 
Justice Department pursued GM over its putatively  anticompetitive practices with respect to its 
financing  arm (GMAC) from  1939 until the consent decree in  1952. Probably the most famous 
case, United  States v.  General Moms (19661, involved an attempt by a group of dealers to get GM 
to stop selling to a discount outlet. Compared with the steel industry, and given the concentration 
in the auto sector, the U.S.  government’s rclationship to the auto industry  in the post-World  War 
I1 period appears benign. 
S  1, There is some significant partisan variance. With the notable exception of Nixon, and possi- 
bly Bush, Republican presidents in the post-World  War I1 period have continued the prewar pattern 
of  greater protectionism (as revealed in commitment to the trade agreements program, accommo- 
dation of prolectionist pressure, and voting record of appointees to the ITC) than Democratic presi- 
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congressional  protectionism  could  be  controlled  through  a combination  of 
presidential leadership and Democratic control of trade policy-relevant  institu- 
tions.s2 However, as argued in section 3.1, executive leadership and congres- 
sional  institutions  broke down, for unrelated  reasons, at the  same time that 
protectionist  pressure  was increasing. As a result, Congress played  a much 
more significant role in defining the trade policy preferences of the U.S. gov- 
ernment. 
3.4.4  Other Participants and Regime Environment 
Of course, given the size and complex nature of auto production, there are 
many other participants in the auto regime. Upstream and downstream firms 
that are linked to auto production are certainly significant players in many as- 
pects of the auto regime, though rarely with respect to trade policy. Similarly, 
local communities and governments in major auto-producing areas are often 
involved in the regime, but at least to this point, they have not been extensively 
mobilized on the trade issue the way the steel industry has mobilized the grass 
roots in its interests. What makes the auto industry interesting from the point 
of view of the NBER project is the entry into the regime of a new player that 
was not socialized to the regime and could not be informally regulated by the 
leader-follower structure or the union, or formally regulated by the U.S. gov- 
ernment: the Japanese auto producers. The linkage of the U.S. market to the 
world market shattered every aspect of  the postwar regime, creating a crisis 
with which the industry is still struggling. 
To understand the significance of the Japanese threat to the auto regime, it 
is important to understand the global organization of that regime as well as the 
domestic organization. For a variety of reasons, both economic and political, 
markets for autos prior to the mid-1960s were primarily  national (or at most 
regional). The interaction of taste and policy was essential here. As a result of 
government policies toward development of  roadway systems, auto taxation, 
and petroleum taxation, consumers demanded  very different automobiles in 
different countries. In the United States, extensive road building and low taxa- 
tion of automobiles and petroleum led to demand for large, powerful, comfort- 
able automobiles, with no particular demand for fuel efficiency. Europe and 
Japan, with less extensive road systems and much higher taxes led to demand 
for smaller, more fuel-efficient, more agile automobiles. Many of the European 
producers  emphasized  niche  marketing,  either  for  luxury  automobiles 
(Daimler-Benz) or popular  automobiles  (VW); in Japan the auto producers 
emphasized the development of products for a growing market with a relatively 
low household income. In addition, with the exception of  the United States, 
auto markets developed behind relatively high barriers to imports." 
52. Nelson (1989a) discusses the link between foreign policy and t:ade  liberalization in more 
detail, while Nelson (1989~)  discusses the role of congressional institutions and executive lead- 
ership. 
53. The U.S.  market had considerable natural protection because of the very different type of 
automobiles demanded by U.S. consumers. 169  The Political Economy of U.S. Automobile Protection 
As a result primarily of the existence of the Big Three U.S.  producers, na- 
tional governments  outside the United States pursued two sorts of policy to- 
ward their national auto market. On the one hand, the governments of Canada, 
Britain, and Germany permitted extensive direct investment (primarily by Ford 
and GM); while, on the other hand, the governments of Japan and France at- 
tempted to restrict their markets to national  Policies of the former 
type resulted in entry by U.S. majors and their participation in essentially oli- 
gopolistic regimes. Not surprisingly from a competitive standpoint, but inter- 
estingly given the difficulty the U.S. majors had in developing  small cars in 
the North American market,  in the United Kingdom and Germany the U.S. 
majors produced small cars of the sort demanded in those markets. As Quinn 
(1988) points out, these European auto markets were not particularly profitable 
for national or multinational firms because the relatively small national mar- 
kets did not allow production at efficient scales. Nonetheless, the key firms in 
the industry (GM and Ford) were unwilling to surrender any open market to 
the other. The expectation was that growth in national income would lead to a 
rapidly expanding demand for automobiles, the exclusion from which could 
result in competitive disadvantages later. 
In France and Italy, the policy of reserving the national market for nationally 
owned firms was associated with macroeconomic goals related to employment 
creation and balance of payments, as well as national prestige. As a result, the 
governments’ goals were consistent with the maintenance of a stable, noncom- 
petitive market. The result was relatively inefficient industries focused on the 
national and regional markets. In the Japanese case, while the government suc- 
ceeded in reserving the national market for nationally owned firms, it did not 
succeed in its attempt to regulate entry by such firms. The result was a highly 
competitive auto industry that, from early in its postwar history, recognized the 
necessity of exporting to achieve the efficient scales of production necessary 
to compete in the national  market. This strong export orientation, emerging 
from a highly competitive national market, was an essentially new element in 
the global auto regime. The first national auto regime to experience the adjust- 
ment crisis associated with export-oriented national producers was the most 
open national market, the United States. 
3.5  Trade Adjustment Crisis in the US.  Automobile Industry 
The 1970s were a watershed  for the auto industry. As we have just seen, 
from the end of World War I1 through the  1960s, the U.S. auto market was 
dominated by three firms in a classic tight oligopoly, with a shrinking fringe 
of small competitors (see fig. 3.12).ss  Over the course of the 1970s this struc- 
ture, and the political economic system of which it was a part, unraveled com- 
54. See Hart (1992) for a comparison of  state policies in the auto (as well as steel and semicon- 
55. See White (1971) for a detailed analysis of  the U.S. auto industry in this period. 
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pletely. The attempt by the major actors in that political economic system to 
reestablish a profitable and stable political economic order is what we refer to 
as an adjustment crisis.s6 This section presents a brief  review  of the recent 
economic history of the auto industry and the evidence of sectoral crisis. 
Much of the history of the U.S. auto industry can be told in the context of a 
product life cycle framework adjusted for large economies of scale in produc- 
tion,  distribution,  and  ma~keting.~’  The early  history  of  the  industry  was 
characterized by  a large number of  essentially craft producers  selling to an 
unstable, specialist market. Henry Ford’s recognition of  the gains from stan- 
dardization and large-scale production resulted in rapid growth in Ford Motor’s 
market share. However, as the market expanded, Alfred Sloan was able to ex- 
pand General Motors’ market share dramatically, and surpass Ford as the in- 
dustry leader in market share and profitability, by offering a wide array of prod- 
ucts. Given the large minimum efficient scales in virtually all aspects of auto 
production  (e.g., engine, transmission, frame, and body production  and final 
assembly), growth of  the market was essential to GM’s strategy.5x  As figure 
56. Note that we are using the expression “political economic system” to refer to the structurally 
local system anchored on the U.S. auto industry. That this system is part of a national and global 
political economic system is undeniable but essentially beyond the scope of  this paper. Thus, as 
we will discuss in greater detail below, the primary actors in this system are the major auto produe- 
ers (home and foreign), the UAW, and the relevant parts of the executive and legislative branches 
of government. Other actors include foreign governments, state and local communities and govern- 
mental organizations, and upstream and downstream industries related to the auto industry. 
57. The notion of a product life cycle was originally developed by Vernon (1966) and Hufbauer 
(1966) and has since become standard fare in textbooks in international economics and marketing. 
58. White (1971) argues that, in addition to the economies of scale in production and marketing, 
the risks associated with introducing new producta in the auto industry mean that  it is no longer 
possible to sustain a competitive position in this market with a single product line. 171  The Political Economy of U.S. Automobile Protection 
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3.12 illustrates, the logic of scale worked itself out in the mature postwar U.S. 
market, with small U.S. producers being driven from the market. Perhaps most 
striking of all, the smallest of the Big Three, Chrysler, was saved from bank- 
ruptcy only through the exceptional agency of a government guaranteed loan. 
As the demand for automobiles in the rest of the world rose over the middle 
years of the twentieth century, the U.S. industry served this developing market 
with both exports from the U.S. and local production. However, since the ex- 
ports and imports constituted a tiny proportion  of  U.S. output (see fig. 3.13) 
and the foreign production was run essentially independently of the home mar- 
ket, the industry’s relationship to the world market had little impact on its struc- 
ture and dynamics in the United States. Furthermore, prior to the  1970s, the 
U.S. major producers seemed oblivious to the implications of the final part of 
the product life cycle: the emergence of global competition as the product and 
its production technology becomes standardized. 
Prior to the mid-l980s, the story of  international competition in the U.S. 
market is a story about small carss9  In the early postwar period, the U.S. ma- 
jors consciously chose to not enter the small-car market.60 Figure 3.14 from 
Abemathy et al. (1983,53) clearly shows the basic economics of this decision: 
whereas small cars cost only slightly less than large cars to make, the price 
59. White (1971, chap.  11) provides an excellent short treatment of the small-car market in the 
United States, on which the discussion presented here depends heavily. 
60. In fact, both GM and Ford announced in  1945 that they would introduce small cars to serve 
what appeared to be a considerable market. Both firms began to design the cars and arrange for 
their production, and both canceled the projects in mid-1946. 172  Douglas R. Nelson 
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Fig. 3.14  Ratio of price to cost of  production by size of car 
Source: Abemathy et al. (1983). 
differential was considerable. Furthermore, the U.S. majors believed that the 
demand for automotive transportation was sufficiently inelastic that most con- 
sumers with  a preference for small cars would  still buy  large cars if  small 
cars were not available. In addition, White (1971) argues that concern with the 
stability of the oligopoly encouraged the majors to stay out of the market. The 
concern was based on the fear that, while the small-car market might support 
one firm, if all three majors entered the market it would not be profitable for 
any of them. Since there was no legal way to share the profits if only one firm 
entered the  small-car market,  they  cooperated  by jointly  staying out of the 
market.h' The first response to the decision by the majors not to produce small 
61. Knickerbocker (1973) develops this type of argument at greater length for the case of  entry 
into small national markets. Specifically, he develops an  entry concentration index to measure 
clustering (in time) of  direct investments in a given national market and shows that low values of 
the index (i.e., low amounts of competitive entry) characterize both competitive and tight oligopo- 
listic market structures, while high values of the index are characteristic of  loose oligopolies. The 
notion is that an oligopoly with a small number of members is able to collude more effectively, 
while loose oligopolies are unable to do so, resulting in inefficient (from the industry's perspective) 
entry. As White (1971) argues, the decision by Ford and GM not to enter the market is evidence 
of, at least implicit, collusion within a tight oligopoly. 
With respect to the Knickerbocker argument, the behavior of the US.  majors with respect to 
small cars can usefully be compared to their behavior with respect to entry in foreign markets. 
The existence of  a stable sectoral regime regulating the U.S. market clearly did not extend to 
regulation of foreign competition-U.S.  firms made direct investments in  a number of small to 
medium-sized markets that, at least at the time of entry, did not obviously support minimum effi- 
cient scale production (e.g., Canada, Mexico, and even the initial entry into European markets). 
The existence of nonregime firms and a nonparticipant state seems to have made it impossible to 
extend the U.S. regime to foreign markets. 173  The Political Economy of U.S. Automobile Protection 
cars was an attempt by U.S. independents, in the early and mid-l950s, to serve 
that market niche. However, none of the independents were able to offer their 
small cars at prices competitive with the low-price full-size models of the ma- 
jors, and none (except Rambler, which was importing its small car from Eng- 
land) was still in the small-car market in 1955. 
The effective response to the oligopolistic caution of the U.S. industry came 
from foreign (primarily European) producers. From less than  1 percent of ap- 
parent consumption through the niid-l950s, imports surged to over 9 percent 
in  1958 and to over 10 percent in  1959. The initial reaction by GM and Ford 
was to import small cars from their subsidiaries in Germany (Ope1 and Taunus) 
and England (Vauxhall and Ford). A more substantial response came in 1959 
with the introduction of domestically produced small cars (e.g., Falcon, Cor- 
vair, and Valiant), which, while substantially reducing sales of captive imports 
and taking  some sales from full-size cars, successfully reduced  the  market 
share of foreign cars to 6.4 percent in  1960 and 4.9 percent in  1961. With 
imports no longer a threat, the U.S. industry began to increase the size and 
weight of their “small” cars (Kwoka 1984). Thus, although imports had been 
held around 5-6  percent of the market in the early 1960s, 1966 saw an import 
share of nearly  10  percent and a steady rate of growth of imports to a 24 per- 
cent share in 1970. Again the U.S. majors responded first with captive imports 
and then with small cars of their own (Vega, Pinto, and Gremlin), but this time 
the environment was different. 
Perhaps the most significant difference was the fact that foreign suppliers 
had by this point established marketing networks and solid reputations in the 
small-car market segment. Thus, even with  locally produced small cars, the 
U.S. majors were unable to drive the import share below 20 percent.62  Foreign 
producers, now including the Japanese, had replaced small independent firms 
focused on niche production for the U.S. market as the competitive “fringe” in 
the U.S. market. These foreign firms, and especially the Japanese with their 
strong export orientation, were not part of the U.S. auto regime: GM did not 
dominate the small-car segment (even in the United States) and was not glob- 
ally organized to compete with the Japanese firms in a way that would permit 
enforcement of the U.S. pricing regime. Perhaps more important, the Japanese 
were not part of the labor relations subsystem of the auto regime, which in the 
late 1960s was undergoing significant strain. In the context of rapid inflation, 
the COLA clauses were generating large increases in wages at a time when 
poor labor relations were contributing to low produ~tivity.~~  As the studies of 
62. It should be noted that this 20 percent is a bit deceptive. During the late 1960s the largest 
source of “foreign” cars was Canada, and the growth in Canadian imports was a function of the 
rationalization of North American production by  the U.S. majors as a result of the US-Canada 
Automotive Products Trade Agreement. However, substantial increases in Japanese market share 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s were a cause of  some concern. 
63. Rothschild (1973) provides an excellent contemporary account of  the pressures on the auto 
regime in the early 1970s. The account of labor relations at GM’s Lordstown plant is particularly 
striking. It is also interesting to note that the Japanese do not figure prominently as competitors 174  Douglas R. Nelson 
competitiveness  reviewed above suggest, the  labor cost differential  between 
U.S. and Japanese producers was a considerable source of competitive advan- 
tage for the Japanese. Thus, given the strains already existing in the labor rela- 
tions system, it is easy to understand the profound impact of Japanese competi- 
tion on that system. When the first oil price shock hit in October 1973, inducing 
a substantial demand shift toward the smaller cars in which foreign producers 
had established themselves as market leaders, the foundation was laid for an- 
other upward jump in foreign market share.hJ 
In addition to changed competitive and demand conditions, U.S. firms also 
faced a changed regulatory environment. In the early and mid- 1970s, at pre- 
cisely the time that the industry was struggling to redesign old product lines 
and come up with new ones to compete with the foreign competition  in the 
expanding small-car market, the federal government imposed strict emission 
control standards under the Clean Air Act of  1970 and binding corporate aver- 
age fuel economy (CAFE) standards under the Energy Policy and Conserva- 
tion Act of 1975. The most detailed study of the consequences of federal motor 
vehicle regulation, Crandall et al. (1986), concludes that, of these regulatory 
interventions, the emission control regulation had the most deleterious effect 
on the industry’s competitiveness vis-A-vis foreign producers and that this ef- 
fect was most severe precisely at the time when the industry was seeking to 
make a transition in its product offerings. Specifically, there were particularly 
severe quality problems  in the  1974 model year producing changed expecta- 
tions with respect to the quality of U.S. small cars in the future-expectations 
that the U.S. industry succeeded in meeting. Thus, when the second oil shock 
reinforced the shift to small cars in the late 1970s the jump in foreign market 
share was both greater and more permanent than that in the early 1970s-from 
a fairly stable 25 percent share in apparent consumption in the mid- 1970s, the 
foreign share jumped to 28 percent in 1979 and 35 percent in  1980. 
From the perspective of political economic analysis, it is important to under- 
stand that these regulatory shocks were independent of  the changes in interna- 
tional competitive conditions. That is, while it is important to understand the 
negative consequences of auto regulation for the international competitiveness 
of  the industry, it is also important to recognize that the form and magnitude 
of that regulation emerged from a political process in which the industry played 
a significant role-first  of  neglect and then of poorly considered political ac- 
tion. Well before imports became a problem for the American auto majors the 
consumer movement had begun to focus on the auto industry. One of the most 
famous documents of early consumerism  is Ralph Nader’s (1965) Unsafe at 
Any Speed, which criticized not only the quality of  the product but the entire 
for the US.  market. Rather the primary concern, relative to the Japanese, seems to be the inability 
of the U.S.  firms to compete beyond the increasingly  saturated U.S. market. 
64. Numerous studies establish a strong causal connection between  the price of gasoline and 
the demand for small cars: Blomqvist and Haessel (1978). Carlson (1978). and Irvinc (1983). 175  The Political Economy of  U.S. Automobile Protection 
auto regime. The auto industry’s attempt to smear Nader backfired badly, ren- 
dering their political attempt to short-circuit consumerist legislation consider- 
ably more difficult. That is, while the consumerist movement (and more gener- 
ally the populist mentality of the 1960s) was exogenous to the auto regime, the 
response by the firms unquestionably worsened the situation. To a significant 
extent, the industry bears considerable responsibility for the hostile political 
economic environment in the context of which the initial import shock of the 
1970s occurred. 
Thus, the U.S. auto regime was collapsing. The product market oligopoly 
and the labor relations regime that relied on it were under pressure from inter- 
national competition and from domestic populist sources. The government ap- 
peared to be increasingly hostile.  By the mid-1970s the U.S. auto industry, 
along with the overall economy, was moving into a deep recession. Profits fell 
from around 20 percent (after-tax profit to stockholders’ equity) for GM and 
Ford in 1978 to -4  percent for GM and -  18 percent for Ford in 1980.65  Simi- 
larly, employment in the motor vehicle industry fell from 925,000 to 714,000 
employees. The industry needed a political instrument with which to recon- 
struct political economic order. “Unfair” Japanese competition was ideal. Japa- 
nese exporters were rapidly increasing sales to the U.S. market (see figs. 3.15A 
and 3.15B). From 8.5 million  units sold in  1978, the U.S. industry sold 5.8 
million in 1980. Over the same period, when most other foreign producers 
experienced little in the way of gains in the U.S. market, Japanese auto produc- 
ers increased their shipments to the United States from 1.5 million to nearly 2 
million units. Even though, as we have seen, foreign competition was not the 
most significant of the industry’s problems, trade policy was politically ideal. 
The focus on foreign competition directed political attention away from prob- 
lems of the industry’s own making while simultaneously emphasizing the need 
for more flexibility from the government  on domestic regulatory  issues and 
from labor on both compensation and work rules. The emphasis on unfairness 
encouraged wider support in both government and civil society. Finally, protec- 
tion was expected to have the effect of disciplining Japanese firms to partici- 
pate in the U.S.  regime, with the additional benefit of tariff-induced transfers 
from consumers to producers. In this situation, it is hardly surprising that the 
industry sought protection from Japanese competition. 
Labor’s support for protection is less understandable in the broader political 
economic context developed in this section. Other things being equal, labor 
could expect to share in the increased rents accruing to the industry, whether 
transferred from U.S. consumers or Japanese producers. Furthermore, the in- 
creased protection was expected to increase the share of Japanese sales in the 
U.S. market  sourced  from  local  production  facilities-long  a  priority  of 
65.  Average profit rates for manufacturing as a whole, for comparison purposes, were 15 percent 
in  1978 and  14 percent in  1980. Comparable numbers are not available for Chrysler which was 
already in a government bailout program. These figures, as well as those in the text, are reported 
in Adams and Brock (1986). 176  Douglas R. Nelson 
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Economic Indicators” (Washington, D.C., February of various years). 
the UAW under the assumption that such facilities would be organized by the 
union. However, both of these expectations relied on the more basic assump- 
tion that the auto regime would continue to function more or less as it had prior 
to the late 1960s. But we have seen that this assumption was, to a considerable 
extent, falsified by later events. The industry used Japanese competition as a 
justification  for extracting concessions  from  labor that reduced  its  share of 
rents in the short run and weakened its bargaining position in the long run. At 
the same time, many of the new Japanese facilities were not unionized, further 
reducing UAW  influence on the auto regime. Finally, the political  focus on 
trade  protection  seems  to have  weakened  labor’s long-standing  drive to in- 
crease plant and industry regulation by government.66  Nonetheless, given the 
UAW’s strong support for protection after a long history of active opposition, 
we must conclude that their evaluation of  the benefits (in terms of increased 
rents and industry expansion) exceeded their evaluation of the possible costs. 
The discussion of this section provides some insight into why the auto re- 
gime crisis beginning in the late 1970s came to be defined politically as a trade 
adjustment crisis in the face of compelling  economic evidence that interna- 
tional  competition  was  not  the  primary  source of  the  industry’s problems. 
While Japanese auto producers may not have constituted a fundamental threat 
to the existence of U.S. auto producers, they did constitute a fundamental threat 
to the political economic regime that regulated relations in the auto sector of 
the U.S. economy. In addition to responding directly to the most serious threat 
66. Labor’s attempts to increase the government’s presence in the workplace can be understood, 
in part, as an attempt to shift the balance of power in capital-labor bargaining. See Noble (1986) 
for an extremely useful discussion of  the politics of OSHA. 177  The Political Economy of U.S. Automobile Protection 
to the auto regime, defining the crisis in that regime as a trade adjustment crisis 
had the added benefit to the firms of justifying  an attempt to reconstitute the 
labor-management system of the regime that had preceded the trade shock by 
at least a decade and of making labor an ally in the politics of  adjustment. 
The next section provides a further illustration of this logic by considering the 
extension of the auto regime on a continental scale.67 
3.6  Regulating the Japanese in the North American Market: APTA, 
CUFTA, and NAFTA 
The story of the auto industry’s role in North American integration is inter- 
esting in its own right, as well as with respect to the light it sheds on the issue 
of adjustment to crisis in the auto regime induced by Japanese competition. In 
the heat of the recent politics of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), the rhetoric on all sides of the issue often lost sight of the facts that 
many U.S. industries (including the auto industry) were already operating on 
a continental scale and that international political frameworks for such integra- 
tion were already in place for auto trade from 1965 under the Automotive Prod- 
ucts Trade Agreement (APTA) and for trade and investment more generally 
from 1988 under the Canada-U.S.  Free Trade Agreement (CUFIA).68  APTA, 
and the politics related  to APTA through the  1970s, resulted from political 
economic strain on the periphery of the auto regime, but with the entry of the 
Japanese into the North American market the key participants in the regime 
became active participants in the politics of CUFTA and NAFTA. 
For all of the usual reasons (from national pride, to employment, to balance 
of  paymentsfforeign  exchange preservation)  the Canadian and Mexican gov- 
ernments have both adopted import substitution policies with respect to both 
final auto assembly and the production of original equipment (“parts”). In both 
countries these policies were implemented with high tariffs and high domestic- 
content requirements. Furthermore, in both cases the governments were con- 
cerned to develop a local parts industry because of high value added in first- 
tier supply.69  Thus, for example, prior to 1962  the Canadian government levied 
a 17.5 percent tariff on finished automobiles and parts but suspended the tariff 
on parts if the part was not produced in Canada and 60 percent of the factory 
cost of the final product was produced in Canada. Certain key parts (e.g., en- 
gines, automatic transmissions, brake linings, and piston facings) faced a tariff 
of 25 percent whether or not the content provision was met. Since both markets 
67. We  will focus on the US.-Canada case because there is a longer history of active political 
economic involvement by the industry and because it is more interesting from the regime-theoretic 
perspective adopted in this paper. 
68. Implementing legislation for CUFTA was passed in late 1988 with a 10-year phase-in pe- 
riod. Thus, the full effects of the CUFTA regime are not to be fell until 1998. It is, of course, true 
that these agreements apply only to trade and investment between the U.S. and Canada. 
69. “First-tier supply’’ refers to the assembly of  components into major subassemblies that are 
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were perceived by producers to be potentially lucrative in the future, all three 
U.S.  majors  had  established  themselves in both  Canada  and  Mexico  (with 
AMC also investing in Canada). The result in both  markets  was the same, 
straightforward extension of the oligopolistic regime with inefficient produc- 
tion (due to levels of output at below efficient scale) sold at high prices yielding 
relatively high profits. All major participants in the regime found this a satis- 
factory arrangement: the firms protected the stability of the oligopoly at satis- 
factory levels of profit; the unions and parts-producing firms were not forced 
to compete across national boundaries; the governments of Canada and Mexico 
had national auto industries at no apparent cost to the U.S. g~vernment.’~ 
As a result of increased competition from European (especially British) auto 
producers  in the  1950s the Canadian government  became increasingly con- 
cerned with the competitiveness of  the Canadian auto industry: “Automobile 
and parts production being an important source of income and employment, 
and the national car having become in many people’s eyes a sign of industrial 
adulthood and a fetish of national identity, the difficulties of the Canadian auto- 
motive industry naturally elicited a variety of schemes for improving the situa- 
tion” (Johnson 1963, 212). It was clear at the time that the essential problem 
was that Canadian producers were producing virtually the same range of prod- 
ucts as they did in the United States at inefficiently small scales.71  At the same 
time, the Canadian auto unions were lobbying aggressively for a government 
response that would protect employment in the industry. As a result, the Cana- 
dian government sought to improve the efficiency (and thus competitiveness) 
of Canadian auto production while increasing the level of production and em- 
ployment in the auto ~ector.~’  To pursue these goals, the Canadian government 
opted for a scheme in which parts imports would be permitted as long as the 
producer (1) increased its exports by an amount equal to the value of the im- 
ports and (2) increased the input of  other Canadian parts to maintain the 60 
70. Of course, the losers  were the Canadian and Mexican consumers who paid a substantial 
premium on automobiles for the questionable benefit of having a national auto industry. 
71. Using White’s (1971) estimate that minimum efficient scale (m.e.s.) for an assembly plant 
producing a single model was about 200,000 units per year and that a firm would want to produce 
at  least two models, FW  use the fact that in  1961 five  firms were producing 327,000 autos to 
conclude that “the total output of the Canadian assembly industry in  1961 was less than White’s 
estimate of m.e.s. for a single firm, and less than White’s estimated m.e.s. for two plants” (172). 
72. The explicit commitment to protection of the industry was justified on the grounds that since 
government policy had now created the conditions for extensive employment in the auto sector, it 
would be “socially irresponsible to adopt any policy which might lead to its drastic contraction” 
(Royal Commission on the Automotive Industry 1961.48). This justification led Harry Johnson to 
comment: “Some day, wneone should write an essay on the concept of responsibility in Canadian 
public life; suffice it to  remark here that the implied doctrine that no mistakes should ever be 
admitted, and no errors ever corrected, if anyone might  be hurt thereby is an exceedingly poor 
basis for intelligent policy-making, especially in an allegedly free-enterprise economy, and a per- 
fect recipe for the preservation and augmentation of wasteful inefficiency and the strangulation of 
economic growth’ (Johnson 1963, 213). Wonnacott (1965) offers a somewhat kinder evaluation 
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percent domestic content. Initially (1962) this scheme was applied only to im- 
ports of  engines and transmissions (both subject to 25 percent duty), but in 
1963 the scheme was extended to encompass all imports of autos and parts. 
While this policy had the intended effect of permitting Canadian firms to 
rationalize production while expanding employment and output, its effect on 
the North American auto regime was not so positive. Because final assembly 
firms “paid” for their increased imports by exporting to the United States, the 
segregation  of national markets was broken down, and with it the universal 
acceptance of the regime by active participants. The arrangement continued to 
be acceptable to the final assembly  firms, which  were now able to arrange 
production somewhat more efficiently. Similarly, the arrangement met the Ca- 
nadian UAW’s concern that any policy to increase competitiveness should not 
result in economic losses to its membership, and it did not affect the core mem- 
bership of the U.S. UAW.  However, a number of U.S. parts suppliers experi- 
enced  increased  competition  from  Canadian  parts  producers  as  the  North 
American majors substituted Canadian parts in U.S. production to “pay” for 
the export of US.-produced engines and transmissions. As a result, U.S. parts 
producers  began  to complain  to congressional representatives, and  in April 
1964, Modine Manufacturing (a producer of radiators) filed a countervailing 
duty  suit  with  the  Treasury  Department  alleging  that  the  Canadian  rebate 
scheme constituted an export s~bsidy.’~  An affirmative finding would have put 
the U.S. government on a collision course with the Canadian government be- 
cause the  countervailing duty would  have offset the Canadian  scheme, un- 
dermining their auto policy.74  Although the U.S. major producers all supported 
the Canadian policy and the U.S. government (with the possible exception of 
the Commerce Department) hoped to avoid levying duties, most experts were 
of the opinion that Modine’s suit would be successful. In the context of the 
Kennedy Round of negotiations, the executive would have found it difficult to 
veto the recommendation for countervailing duties. While the Canadian gov- 
ernment did not  want to withdraw  its  auto policy  and could not politically 
afford to be  seen to knuckle under to U.S. pressure, it obviously wanted  to 
avoid a trade war. 
Thus, under a deadline imposed by the countervailing duty process, the US. 
and Canadian governments negotiated  the APTA. The agreement that was fi- 
nally negotiated  was not a free trade agreement, but an asymmetric arrange- 
ment that essentially allowed the Canadian government to pursue its policy of 
rationalization  and expansion of the Canadian auto industry without threat of 
U.S.-administered  protection. Specifically, the United States agreed to permit 
duty-free access of Canadian-produced autos and parts if they met a 50 percent 
73. Recall that, at this time, it was not necessary to prove injury to have a countervailing duty im- 
74. See Keeley (1983) for a detailed description of  the politics of  both the duty remission 
posed. 
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North American content req~irement.~~  On the other hand, for duty-free access 
to  Canada,  automakers  were  required  to  (1) maintain  the  same ratio  of 
Canadian-produced autos to Canadian sales as prior to APTA (and specifically 
not less than 75 percent) and (2) maintain the level of domestic content that 
obtained in  1964. In addition, the Canadian government sought agreement to 
a 6 percent annual increase in Canadian output. However, the U.S. government 
found such a proposal unacceptable as part of an official agreement. As a re- 
sult, the Canadian government negotiated side-agreements in the form of let- 
ters of agreement with the major producers that they would (1) increase Cana- 
dian value added by at least 60 percent of any growth in Canadian sales and 
(2) increase Canadian valued added by an additional C$260 million above the 
1964 level, and above that necessary to meet the growth agreement, by 1968. 
Keohane and Nye (1 977,207) report a comment by an American official to 
the effect that, “We knew about the Canadian plan to blackjack the companies, 
but we expected them to be better bargainers.” But, of course, this misses the 
point. The firms were perfectly satisfied with this arrangement. The problem 
was not the firms, but the conflicting expectations of  the U.S. and Canadian 
governrnent~.’~  The U.S. government saw the Canadian safeguards as a tempo- 
rary expedient intended to ease the transition  to genuine U.S.-Canadian  free 
trade in automotive products, while the Canadian government  saw the safe- 
guards as a permanent part of a market-sharing agreement that was itself part 
of industrial policy for the auto industry. Although the U.S. government regu- 
larly expressed dissatisfaction with Canada’s unwillingness to phase out the 
safeguards, there was no pressure  from the industry  and  so the  safeguards 
stayed in place. 
Under AFTA the  U.S. majors were,  in fact, able to rationalize Canadian 
production. The number of  different models produced in Canada and, more 
important, the number of models produced in each Canadian factory, were dra- 
matically  It took the shock of Japanese entry into the North Ameri- 
can market, and especially Japanese foreign direct investment, to produce ac- 
tive lobbying by the major auto producers and the U.S. UAW. We have already 
seen that U.S. protection, along with equivalent protection in Canada, led to 
decisions by  the major Japanese producers  to invest in the North American 
75. Recall that we are using “parts” to refer to inputs for original equipment, not replacement 
parts. The latter were excluded from the arrangement completely because it proved impossible to 
find a formula that was satisfactory to U.S. and Canadian parts producers simultaneously. 
76. In addition to Keeley (1983),  see Wonnacott (1987) for a useful discussion of the conflicting 
expectations of the U.S. and Canadian governments with respect to APTA. 
77. FW  argue that, while there were efficiency gains from North American liberalization of auto 
trade, much of the expansion of Canadian auto production would have occurred in any case as a 
result of a growing market, a falling Canadian dollar, and relatively low costs of capital, labor, and 
inputs. However, FW’s analysis does not take into account the fortuitous, for the Canadian industry, 
decision to specialize Canadian production facilities in new, small cars that were to be an essential 
part of the US.  industry’s response to Japanese imports. In any event, the core participants in the 
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market. The attempt to regulate such investment in a manner consistent with 
oligopolistic control of the North American market encouraged the auto pro- 
ducers to become politically active on an issue that would pit the U.S. UAW 
against the Canadian autoworkers’ union (ultimately resulting in secession by 
the Canadian autoworkers and the formation of a new Canadian Auto Workers 
[CAW] union) and the U.S. government against the Canadian government.’* 
Where the unions and the governments were primarily concerned with max- 
imizing national shares of any new production or employment, the auto firms 
wanted to socialize the Japanese firms into the ways of the local oligopoly . . . 
as junior partners. As a result, where the main issue for the national unions and 
governments related to Canadian attempts to use the duty rebate scheme to 
encourage Japanese investment in Canada, the firms were more interested in 
defining the domestic-content rules and rules of origin to their advantage. 
Where the Canadian duty rebate program of the early 1960s elicited objec- 
tions only from the periphery of the auto regime (parts manufacturers), when 
Canada reintroduced rebates of duties on imports from Japan in exchange for 
Japanese exports to the  United States, in  1984-85,  during a period of  auto 
regime crisis, the response by  the U.S. UAW  and the U.S. government was 
immediate. Although, as Wonnacott (1987) points out, the countervailing duty 
channel was no longer available since it was not clear that the U.S. industry 
could show injury under the new  title VII regulations, the U.S. government 
sought to change the auto regulations through the negotiations on the broader 
CUFTA. The primary goals of US. negotiators, with respect to autos, were to 
construct a system with  more  symmetrical obligations for Canada and the 
United States, and to move toward regional free trade in  autos. In addition, 
the U.S. majors and the UAW  lobbied for stronger controls on Japanese firms 
producing in the North American market. The United States was successful 
with respect to all three goals.79  CUFTA calls for duty-free trade between the 
United States and Canada in autos and parts following a  10-year phase-in. 
Because the tariffs created the barrier that made the duty remission an effective 
policy, the move to free trade in automotive products essentially accomplishes 
both of the first two goals. That is, U.S. auto and parts producers could theoreti- 
cally shut down Canadian operations and serve the Canadian market duty free 
from the United States as long as they met CUFTA rules of  origin. The only 
remaining reason to retain AFTA producer status would be to be able to import 
third-country automotive products into Canada duty free. With respect to the 
last goal, after a phase-in period, CUFTA prohibits the introduction of  new 
duty waivers and the granting of AFTA producer status to any firm that did not 
78. See Yates (1993) for a useful discussion of the labor politics of North American auto inte- 
gration. 
79. See Johnson (1993) for a detailed discussion of the effects of CUFTA on the rules regulating 
U.S.-Canadian auto trade. The lTC’s report on rules-of-origin issues in NAFTA (USITC  1991) 
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already have such status.80  Thus, unlike U.S. majors that retain APTA producer 
status, Honda, Toyota, and Hyundai will be unable to import autos and parts 
into Canada from third countries (i.e., Japan and Korea) duty free, even if they 
meet domestic-content standards (all three have production facilities in Can- 
ada). Thus, without  the duty waiver, to the extent that these firms source a 
considerable share of inputs from third countries, they will be at a competitive 
disadvantage vis-a-vis the North American majors. At the same time, produc- 
ers that meet North American content requirements will have duty-free access 
to the entire North American market. Thus, third-country producers can serve 
the Canadian market duty free from the United States without meeting APTA 
safeguard conditions. 
While CUFTA will be replaced by NAFTA, the latter essentially extends the 
main details of CUFTA to include Mexico. Some of the details of the transition 
have involved minor  revision  (e.g., the date for ending  export-related duty 
drawbacks is pushed forward to 1996). The major change is that NAFTA rules 
of origin are more stringent than those in CUFTA, thus increasing somewhat 
the cost of  non-North  American firms in competition  with North American 
firms. 
While it is extremely unlikely that Canadian, or Mexican, production of au- 
tos and parts will be completely shut down, the conditions that led to booming 
Canadian auto sector production  and employment in the  1980s are unlikely 
to continue. 
3.7  Conclusions: The Future of the North American Auto Industry 
We have seen that during the 1970s the auto industry, unable to respond to 
increased competition from Japanese firms, turned increasingly to the govern- 
ment for assistance. In addition to regulatory relief and a variety of lesser sub- 
sidies, the industry succeeded in convincing the government to provide direct 
restraint on Japanese imports. As a result of continuing recession, and thus low 
demand for autos, the trade restraints were not binding in the first two years of 
the program; however, the recovery of the economy led to surging demand, 
employment, and output. In addition, the industry was able to raise prices with- 
out fear of competition from the restrained Japanese producers. The result was 
historically  unprecedented  levels of profit, and equally unprecedented levels 
of executive compensation. At least in part as a consequence of this strategy 
of exploiting the protected market, when imports squeezed Big Three profits 
in 1985 and then when the market turned down again in 1986, the reservoirs of 
public sympathy were considerably lower.*' Unfortunately for protectionists, 
80. Export-based duty remission must end by  January  I, 1994, and production-based duty re- 
mission by January 1,  1996. 
81. Some have argued that the industry's reduced influence in the late  1980s and early  1990s 
results from the reduced size of  the industry-both  in financial and employment terms. While the 
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Japanese import quantities also turned down sharply in  1987 (see fig. 3.12), 
and although the Japanese government announced continuing observance of a 
2.3 million unit VER in 1988 and 1989, this was not even close to binding.** 
Through the mid- and late 1980s the Japanese increasingly served the North 
American  market  from  North  American  production  facilities. As  a  result, 
whereas the Japanese exported only 1.73 million automobiles and light trucks 
to the United States in  1991, their North American facilities sold  1.3 million 
units. Furthermore, this period also saw substantial increases in North Ameri- 
can investment by Japanese parts producers. Thus, when sharp drops in sales 
in  1990 and  1991 led to sharp reductions in employment and large losses at 
GM and Chrysler, simple trade restrictions would accomplish neither the short- 
term goal of protection nor the longer-term goal of imposing regime discipline 
on foreign competition. The Bush administration, facing what appeared to be 
only modest reelection pressure, offered a scheme based on marginal adjust- 
ments in antitrust and trade enforcement. Specifically, the Justice Department 
announced that it intended to enforce U.S. antitrust laws against the U.S. oper- 
ations of Japanese firms, with particular reference to the relationship between 
auto assemblers and their parts suppliers. In addition, the U.S. Customs Bureau 
ruled that autos produced by Honda in Canada did not contain sufficient do- 
mestic  content to enter the United  States duty free.83 In the context of  the 
NAFTA, negotiations on rules-of-origin issues for the auto industry, this was a 
fairly clear signal of protectionist intent. At the same time, the Treasury De- 
partment suggested changing the tariff on minivans from 2.5 to 25 percent. 
However, the industry and the UAW pushed for stronger restrictions in Con- 
gress. Representatives Gephardt (D-Mo.) and Levin (D-Mich.) proposed re- 
stricting Japanese firms’ sales to 3.8 million vehicles, including local produc- 
tion  with  local  content  less  than  50  percent.  Senator  Baucus  (D-Mont.) 
proposed even stronger legislation, restricting sales to 3.6 million units with a 
70 percent local-content requirement. 
The essential point, however, is that unlike the period of the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, the public debate involved considerably more criticism of the U.S. 
firms, their management, and the UAW  (Stokes 1992). High wage premiums 
for UAW workers and large executive pay increases combined with a continu- 
ing large quality differential between the products of Japanese and American 
auto firms tended to undercut public support for trade activism. When market 
conditions  and  the  performance  of  U.S.  firms improved  in  1993, a widely 
in the U.S. economy. Similarly, while UAW membership has declined dramatically,  it remains a 
major force, with concentrations of influence  in more or less the same places as it had in the late 
1970s. The existence of sizable Japanese producers in the United States must have some influence, 
but their foreign ownership continues to create serious problems in projecting the influence that 
would normally be a correlate of their economic significance. 
82. It is interesting to note, though, that whereas import quantity turned sharply downward in 
1987, import values merely stabilized. 
83. See Palmeter (1992) for a useful discussion of the details of  this bizarre case. 184  Douglas R. Nelson 
leaked plan by Ford and the UAW to file antidumping charges against Japanese 
exporters was never advanced, and although Harold Poling and Owen Bieber 
suggested that the  ITC self-initiate such  an investigation,  the issue has not 
been 
Ford, Chrysler, and, probably, GM emerged from the political economic cri- 
sis of the late 1970s and 1980s more competitive and more international. Rela- 
tions with  parts suppliers, the UAW,  and dealers are still being worked out 
but appear to be moving toward new foundations that will permit both greater 
competitiveness and improved long-run relations. Along with substantial ex- 
change rate adjustments, these changes have allowed the U.S. majors  to in- 
crease market share and profitability of the North American market. This will 
undoubtedly lead many to conclude that the trade policy activism of the 1980s 
was a success. But such a conclusion is based on no more than the fallacy of 
post hoc, ergo propter hoc. It seems to me that there are two broad lessons of 
the auto experience in the 1980s. First, competition improves performance. It 
was the sustained competition from efficient, export-oriented Japanese firms 
that produced the changes in the U.S. auto producers that are being celebrated 
in the specialist auto media and the popular press today. There is not a shred 
of evidence that the innovations in organization, product, and process that de- 
fine the new auto industry would have occurred without that competition. Sec- 
ond, trade policy was not essential to improved performance. The primary ef- 
fect of  trade activism, during the brief period in the mid-1980s when it was 
binding, was to transfer rents from consumers to foreign and domestic firms. 
Also of interest are two political economic lessons. First, short of autarky, 
trade policy is not able to enforce a domestic sectoral regime. One of the strik- 
ing things about the story told in this paper is that, while the auto industry got 
more or less what it wanted from the state, it was the U.S.  industry, not the 
Japanese industry, that did the adjusting. Competition in the auto industry is 
now global competition. Given international sourcing strategies, multinational 
investment, joint ventures,  and captive imports, even the meaning of a “na- 
tional” industry has become unclear. The U.S. auto industry’s attempt to resist 
this reality  ultimately  failed.85 That is, the protection may  have delayed the 
adjustment by  a matter of  five or six years, at considerable cost to the con- 
sumer, but the result is a global auto regime. The continued viability of GM, 
Ford, and Chrysler depends on their ability to adjust to this new reality and to 
participate in the creation of  a political economic regime that does not rely on 
the policy actions of a single national government, even one as powerful as the 
United StatesB6 
84.  See Inside U.S.  Trade, February 26, 1993,  for a report of the comments by Poling and Bieber. 
85. The attempts by  the European  industry and by  Canadian labor to avoid this logic seem 
increasingly desperate, though both continue to fight the valiant fight. 
86. Note that I am not arguing that government intervention has no effect. Quite to the contrary. 
We have seen in this paper that the effects can be considerable. The point is that, in the context of 
large changes in a complex industrial regime, it is virtually impossible to predict consequences 
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The second political economic lesson is that only strong, consistent execu- 
tive leadership can protect Liberal trading relations. The auto case illustrates 
clearly that rhetorical commitment to free trade is far from sufficient. Without 
strong leadership, local interests dominate the process of making trade policy. 
This has always been true. One of the triumphs of the New Deal was the institu- 
tionalization in the executive and legislative branches of a commitment to trade 
liberalization. The breakdown of these institutions in Congress makes execu- 
tive leadership all the more important. One of the failures of the Reagan admin- 
istration, especially by comparison to the Carter administration, was the lack 
of leadership on trade. The result of this lack of a systematic trade agenda, as 
Niskanen (1989) cogently  argues, was sequential response to crises and the 
institutionalization for the first time in the postwar era of fair trade as the prac- 
tical core of administration  trade policy. The irony of recent trade policy is 
that, whereas the Democrats and Republicans in Congress switched from their 
traditional positions on the trade issue, with the exception of Richard Nixon 
(and possibly George Bush), Democratic presidents have continued to show 
greater commitment to trade Liberalism than Republican presidents.87  Indus- 
tries will continue to seek transfers via the trade policy process and will con- 
tinue to claim unfairness  as part of  their strategy. As the case of the Carter 
administration shows, only the commitment of real political resources, as well 
as rhetorical commitment, can substitute for the institutions that disappeared 
in the 1970s. 
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Comment  Anne E. Brunsdale and Randi Boorstein 
In this paper, Douglas Nelson provides a tremendous synthesis of information 
and an excellent and thorough review of papers having to do  with international 
auto trade. 
We  agree with the author’s main conclusion  (I) that trade policy was not 
successful in achieving  the long-run  political goal of disciplining Japanese 
competition and (2) that it was competition, not trade policy, that spurred the 
U.S.  industry to improve quality and lower costs. However, these points are not 
supported well by the literature survey. Rather, the conclusion seems almost 
tangential. The paper would benefit from a more focused approach that allows 
the conclusion to flow from the material. The second major conclusion, that 
strong and consistent executive leadership is needed to protect liberal trade, is 
Anne  E. Brunsdale is former chairman of  the  US. International Trade Commission.  Randi 
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also true. However, we challenge the generalization that Democrats are more 
likely than Republicans to be “free trade” executives (section 3.7). 
1. Nelson’s point that protection did not work can be viewed from different 
perspectives. For example, the protection was not tough enough. Clearly, there 
is some combination of  trade policy  and foreign investment restrictions that 
could have ensured high profits to the U.S. industry as long as they remained 
in effect. However, the U.S. government was unwilling to impose those kinds 
of high costs on U.S. consumers or to grant such special treatment to the Big 
Three. The government was also unwilling to classify Japanese transplants as 
outside the U.S. auto industry, showing that its auto policy was more sensitive 
to the jobs issue than to the profit issue. 
2. While the paper touches on the quality-upgrading literature (i.e., Feens- 
tra), it does not mention the positive effect U.S. restrictions had on Japanese 
firms and their ability to move into the mainstream in the eyes of U.S. consum- 
ers. In the early  1980s it became very clear to consumers that Japanese cars 
were of higher quality and more reliable than most U.S. cars. That, coupled 
with the executive bonuses mentioned in the paper, made it difficult for politi- 
cians to make  a convincing case against  Japanese auto imports. Too many 
American consumers were choosing Japanese cars. The auto market is very 
different from a commodity market, such as steel, where the ultimate consumer 
does not have the same kind of visible preferences. 
At  some point, when it became clear that the Japanese auto industry was 
doing a better job than the U.S. industry, the emphasis of the Big Three and 
protectionist politicians shifted to accusing Japanese of blocking U.S.  imports 
into Japan. That was needed to provide some foundation for U.S. protection. 
3. The welfare analysis section (section 3.3) could be beefed up and dis- 
cussed more fully. As policymakers confronted with different conclusions by 
highly respected economists, we would like very much to know whether one 
approach, and which one, is more reliable than the others. Another, more picky 
point is that the section on comparative advantage comparing costs (tables 3.2 
and 3.3) concludes that unit labor cost in U.S. autos versus U.S.  manufacturing 
is higher than that same ratio for Japan. However, the numbers seem very unre- 
liable for such a conclusion. If one looks at 1978 rather than  1980, the unit 
labor cost in Japanese autos looks comparatively high. 
4.  The political  economy  conclusions  are a bit  simplistic, although  it is 
clear that politicians do not maximize social welfare functions, as defined in 
theoretical terms. Economists looking at overall welfare always assume some 
costless redistribution scheme that can leave the protected industry as well off 
as it would be with protection and leave everyone else better off. In reality, of 
course, the redistribution does not happen: protection is not usually replaced 
with another less costly alternative. Therefore, politicians support their constit- 
uents; for example, Michigan politicians support the auto industry. Politicians 
are willing to trade protection of one industry for protection of another (textiles 193  The Political Economy of US. Automobile Protection 
for autos, or perhaps for other local legislation). Thus politicians in all pro- 
tected sectors help each other. 
Economists, assuming they believe that trade protection is injurious, may be 
less influential than they could otherwise be because so much effort is concen- 
trated on finding exceptions where trade policy can help a country’s welfare to 
improve. For example, the whole Krugman strategic trade debate was picked 
up by the popular press and by special interest groups looking for trade protec- 
tion. While interesting from a theoretical point of  view, the concentration on 
exceptions to the rule may actually confuse the debate for policymakers. 
5.  We disagree with Nelson’s conclusion that administrated protection (sec- 
tion 201 and title VII) plays a fundamental role in supporting the liberalization 
process. Particularly in recent years, dumping cases and dumping regimes have 
proliferated. They are a very dangerous form of protection because once the 
rules are spelled out and once a set of commissioners is in place, there is no 
check on their use. 
Duties tend to be very high, and there is no sunset provision on those duties. 
Specific countries can be targeted (e.g., China and Japan) so that there is no 
global outcry over their use. 
In the case of  Eastern Europe and the former  Soviet Union, the threat of 
dumping is likely to lead to restrictive agreements such as the uranium and 
aluminum agreements. Why? Because these industries are likely to sell their 
products below  cost (as defined by  the Department of  Commerce) during 
their transition to fully operational market economies. 
With respect to autos, the Big Three have difficulty prevailing  in an anti- 
dumping suit because Japanese transplants are treated as part of the U.S. auto 
industry, and U.S. automakers’ production  in Canada is not. Also, the Big 
Three have been making money in recent years. The minivans case, although 
resulting in a negative determination, did lead to price increases in Japanese 
minivans. 
6. As the author discusses, big business and unions were not pushing for 
protection for most of the postwar era. Then energy shocks, combined with the 
rise in the value of the dollar, created unprecedented pressure to protect certain 
U.S. industries. While one can fault the Reagan and Bush administrations for 
certain trade policy  actions, they certainly cannot be blamed for the Multi- 
Fiber Arrangement or for steel restrictions that  had been  in place for many 
years. Moreover, Bush deserves most of the credit for the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for keeping the Congress at bay, for holding Super 
301 initiatives to a minimum, and for appointing some free trade commission- 
ers. (One should keep in mind that all commissioners must be approved by 
Congress. Congress would not approve Baldwin in the 1980s.) 
In addition, it may be harder for a Republican than for a Democrat to keep 
the Democratic Congress in line for free trade initiatives. It is likely that Demo- 
cratic opposition to NAFTA would have been stronger if Bush had been mak- 
ing the proposal. 194  Douglas R. Nelson 
Comment  Richard N. Cooper 
Nelson has written a fine paper, blending traditional economic analysis, politi- 
cal analysis, and analysis of  regime stability and stress. I learned  much  and 
have little to add. It should be read by trade policy officials. It is useful to repeat 
two of Nelson’s conclusions, buried in the middle of the paper, in summing up 
the troubled period of  the  last two decades for the automobile industry: “It 
seems reasonable  to conclude  that  the  U.S.  industry  is  somewhat  smaller, 
somewhat more flexible, and somewhat more efficient. . . , It is Jupunese com- 
petition, not  U.S. protection, that accounts for the improvements in pedor- 
mance by the major U.S. auto producers” (emphasis added). This is an im- 
portant lesson for policymakers and the auto industry in Europe, where Japan 
has been persuaded to restrain its auto exports, and for policymakers and other 
industries in the United States. Protection through Japanese voluntary export 
restraint (VER) on automobiles to the United States, begun for two years in 
1981 and finally allowed to lapse only in 1993 (lesson: treat with extreme skep- 
ticism the term “temporary” as applied to import restrictions), served mainly 
to permit  both  Japanese  and American  firms to extract higher  profits  from 
American consumers and to provide a framework within which Japanese firms 
could establish themselves as reliable producers of upscale automobiles in the 
United States, not to increase employment in the auto industry. 
The American automobile industry  for years largely ignored the signals it 
was getting from American consumers, particularly those along both coasts of 
the country, far from Detroit. Through their purchasing behavior, consumers 
started signaling in the mid- 1950s that they wanted a smaller, more economical 
car,  suitable for congested  urban  traffic  and  parking.  Growing  sales of  the 
homely Volkswagen Beetle was the main manifestation. The American majors 
did not respond with their “compacts” until imports finally reached 10 percent 
of  total  sales.  I  purchased  one  of  the  responses,  a  1961 Ford  Falcon  sta- 
tionwagon. Six years later that model had been lengthened by well over a foot. 
I currently own a 1973 Plymouth Valiant, a fine car produced by Chrysler as a 
“compact,” that is, its response to import competition  in the early  1970s. In 
1994 it is the largest car in my neighborhood. The majors were determined to 
sell large cars-perhaps,  as Nelson suggests, because they made much higher 
profit per unit on large cars and because they deemed U.S. demand for autos 
to be price inelastic, thus greatly underestimating the move by Americans to 
two- and even three-car households, with the supplementary cars often being 
small, and imported. 
One of the rationales for limiting imports was to protect employment in an 
important U.S. industry. The VER clearly failed in this regard. Although U.S. 
auto production reached the level of its previous  1978 peak again in 1985, and 
greatly exceeded it in  1988-89,  employment continued to decline from  1985 
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on, after a brief recovery from the  1982 recession. By  1989 it was only  1.6 
percent of U.S. employment in all manufacturing, compared with 2.1 percent 
in 1978. Part of the reason is the continuing rise in the wages of  autoworkers 
compared with the average wage in all manufacturing, from 64 percent higher 
in  1978 to 88 percent higher in  1990. But part of  the reason is that the auto 
majors  chose  to use  protection  from Japanese  imports to raise their prices 
rather than to increase their share of sales in the domestic market. That is, they 
chose to forgo increases in production that the VER would have permitted in 
the mid-1980s. That was not a surprising result to theorists of trade policy. 
Import competition under tariffs breaks any monopoly power that domestic 
producers may have. But quantitative restrictions on imports restore that power 
and permit domestic producers to raise prices to the point at which marginal 
costs equal downward-sloping marginal revenue by restricting production be- 
low what it otherwise might be. The domestic producers’ room  for pricing 
maneuver is increased even if the quantitative restrictions do not bind. Thus 
the auto firms gained not only at the expense of American consumers, but also, 
during this period, at the expense of autoworkers laid off or not rehired. They 
also unwisely permitted the Japanese firms to raise their prices  higher  than 
otherwise, thus raising the profits and investment of Japanese firms, to upgrade 
their product quality, and to establish brand loyalties among American consum- 
ers for upscale Japanese automobiles. In short, the American majors may have 
profited in the short run of several years in the 1980s at the expense of  long- 
run market share, production, employment, and profits. 
Nelson’s  already long paper would have been more complete if  it had also 
looked at the political economy of the VER in Japan. As Nelson notes in pass- 
ing, Japan’s automobile industry was not under close control by the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry (MITI), but that was not for lack of several 
attempts by MITI to bring autos under its wing. Ironically, U.S. protectionist 
pressure brought final success to MITI. If Japan was to limit exports of automo- 
biles to the United States to 1.68 million per year (later 1.85 million, then 2.3 
million,  and down to  1.65 million in  1992-93),  some mechanism had to be 
found for allocating the limit among the six or more contending Japanese firms 
and for policing it. That role fell to MITI. As usual with quantitative restric- 
tions, the bulk of the allocation went to the firms that were already well estab- 
lished in the US.  market, the newer and more rapidly growing firms bore the 
brunt of the restriction, and potential new entrants were frozen out. That may 
have suited the larger Japanese firms, who were the major beneficiaries of the 
price increases permitted by the VER. But the key point is that it brought an 
independent and highly competitive industry under MITI control for a decade, 
greatly  enhanced profits in the established Japanese auto firms, and reduced 
competition in the U.S. market not only between U.S. and Japanese firms but 
also among Japanese firms. 
The U.S. automobile firms and U.S. policymakers should be asking them- 
selves: was the “breathing spell” worth it? This Page Intentionally Left Blank